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
IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED HEAV
AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH AND DWELT AMONG US

REALITY

WINTER 1950

INSTITUTE of SPIRITUALITY
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REALITY

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REALITY is a publication of Thomistic studies by the Dominican Students of the Province of St. Albert the Great, Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Ill.
cum permissu superiorum

God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.

Pius XII
Encyclical Humani Generis

INTRODUCTORY MESSAGE

IN WELCOMING the first issue of *Reality*, our students' publication, we must express our sincere congratulations to the present student body of our House of Studies for their interest, enthusiasm and understanding of the objective proposed to them in the projection of *Reality*. We hail the founding editors and pray their initial efforts will produce through the years the beneficial results we dream of in establishing this medium of expression for our young Dominicans who envision great works for the Order and the Church in the years ahead. Our sincere appreciation, also, goes to the consultors and revisors of the Faculty, who with patience and understanding have guided the first steps of earnest effort to assist our young Dominicans in their preparation for the challenging apostolate that awaits their years in the ministry.

Reality is for circulation within the Province and the Order. Our students recognize the special field of their endeavor. *Reality* is to be their training ground for the apostolate of the pen which is mightier in our day than ever before.

Reality seems to be a formidable name for this publication in view of its aim and objective. Rather than venture an opinion as to the selection of this name it is better to present the Editor's statement as to why our students selected it in preference to many names submitted.

"When plans for the organization of the students' publication were first formulated early this year, the name *Reality* was the overwhelmmingly popular choice for a title. The students hope through the medium of this publication not only to acquire literary proficiency but to manifest in some degree that their pursuit of philosophy and theology is not walled up in some idle "ivory tower," but possesses a vitality which can only be realized when science is based upon the actual, the real, whether it be finite or infinite, created or uncreated. Without the contact of reality neither metaphysical nor theological knowledge can attain its perfection through acquisition of truth. We felt the term *Reality* came more closely to the realization of this ideal than any of the other suggested titles.

"It was a source of satisfaction then to find the same title applied to the recent English translation of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's Thomistic synthesis. We have no illusions that our publication will ever attain to the depths of scholarship acquired by this great Thomist. But we feel that the coincidental choice of the same name will serve to keep ever before us our ideal, of which he is a living embodiment."

I am happy to commend the efforts of our students to the Fathers of the Province. *Reality* is another expression of our youth. We are building for the morrow; not simply new buildings to provide for our steadily increasing numbers but everything that will contribute to the fullest expression of our Dominican vocation in its service to souls and the Church. We beg for this effort the blessing of God and the prayers of our illustrious brethren of the past years and centuries who gave freely and fully of their heart and mind to spread the truth, to combat error, to guide men along the path that leads to everlasting peace and glory.

For *Reality* our prayer is: *Ad multos annos!*

Edward L. Hughes, O.P.
Provincial

Feast of St. Albert the Great
November 15, 1950

MARY MEDIATRIX

IN THE three major apparitions of Our Blessed Lady which occurred during the last century, and which have been recognized by ecclesiastical authority, one fact stands out very forcefully: in Mary lies a peculiarly efficacious means to the solution of present-day problems. At LaSalette in 1846, the Blessed Virgin described herself as holding back the arm of her divine Son from taking vengeance on the world for its sins. At Lourdes in 1858, she told St. Bernadette to understand that the recitation of her Rosary is most pleasing and acceptable to God. And in 1917 at Fatima, she promised the children to obtain peace and the conversion of Russia if the world would heed her message.

The establishment of the feast of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mediatrix of All Graces by Pope Benedict XV in 1921 again focused the attention of the universal Church on the importance of Our Blessed Mother's intercession in the economy of salvation. Nor did this action on the part of the Holy Father come as a surprise, because the theological background of Mary's role in Divine Providence has been in the process of formation for centuries. The purpose of this article is to trace the gradual development of the doctrine of Our Blessed Mother's universal mediation in the more important statements of the Fathers of the Church. But first a brief explanation of the word "mediatrix."

Mediatrix

The term "meriatrix" is simply the feminine form of the word *mediator.* A mediator is one who stands between two parties for the purpose of bringing them together in mutual understanding. In the spiritual order, a mediator is one who stands between God and men in order to bring divine graces to us and to offer our prayers and sacrifices to God in return. Christ, as man, is the principal and only necessary mediator between God and ourselves. He is between God and men because, as man, He is beneath God; yet, He is above men because His human nature is united to the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity.

When we speak of the Blessed Virgin as our mediatrix, we do not mean to substitute her for Christ. Rather, we say that her mediation is entirely dependent upon the merits of her divine Son. Because of her great dignity as mother of God, she stands above all other men; but, as a creature, she is infinitely below the Divinity. Hence, she has the qualifications of a mediatrix. Her actual mediation depends upon her divine appointment to this office. But has God actually decreed that Mary should be our universal mediatrix?

Theologians answer this question by drawing a parallel between Christ and Mary. Since Mary's mediation is based upon the merits of her Son, her mediation will follow the same pattern as His. Now, Christ officially became our mediator by His redemptive death on the cross, through which He merited for us the remission of our sins and all other graces. But Mary cooperated in a very intimate and special way in the work of our redemption. Therefore, say the theologians, in the very act of willing to have her share thus in her Son's sacrifice, God has established her in the office of mediatrix.

But just how did the Blessed Virgin cooperate in the redemption? In the first place, she gave her free consent not only to becoming Our Lord's mother, but also to His death on the cross. Secondly, because of her plenitude of grace, which enabled her to practice all virtues in a perfect degree, and through her close association with Jesus from Bethlehem to Calvary, she merited congruously everything that Christ merited according to strict justice. By "congruously," theologians mean that Our Blessed Mother was so pleasing to God that her actions induced Him to grant her, out of His mercy, a moral right to the very same graces over which her Son merited a strict right. And since Christ merited all graces for us, so also has Mary merited all graces which come to us. Mary's final act of cooperation with her Son's redemption is her continuous intercession for us in heaven as Queen and Spiritual Mother of all men.

That, we say, is the way theologians argue in favor of Our Blessed Mother's universal mediation. But we are not so much interested here in theological arguments as we are in pointing out the positive testimony to be found in the writings of the Fathers of the Church. Indeed, as we trace their opinions down through the ages, we see a remarkable instance of the manner in which many of our Catholic dogmas have progressed from mere "hints" of a truth to express statements of the doctrine.

The Old Eve Versus The New Eve

Today, theologians are almost unanimous in proclaiming the Blessed Virgin Mary "Mediatrix of all Graces." Among the Apostolic Fathers of the first three centuries, however, we do not find the word mediatrix used even once. But if we examine their works closely, we begin to discover our first patristic clue. This clue consists in a detailed comparison by the early Fathers between Eve and the Blessed Virgin, based on their interpretation and reading of Genesis 3:15—"I will put enmities between thee and the woman, and thy seed and her seed: she shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel." This passage, commonly known as the "protoevangelium" because it contains the first reference to the Redeemer, led ancient Christian writers to portray Mary as the heroine who undoes the mischief wrought by the villain Eve. Thus, we find them attributing to Mary an important position in the work of redemption. The doctrine of her universal mediation gradually evolved from further elaboration of this comparison.

Going back to the very beginnings of the Christian era, we find this comparison between Eve and the Virgin Mary formulated by St. Justin

Martyr, who wrote in his *Dialogue with Trypho* toward the middle of the second century:

> . . . we find it written . . . that He (Christ) is born of the Virgin, in order that the disobedience caused by the serpent might be destroyed in the same manner in which it had originated. For Eve, an undefiled virgin, conceived the word of the serpent, and brought forth disobedience and death. But the Virgin Mary, filled with faith and joy, when the angel Gabriel announced to her the good tidings that the Spirit of the Lord would come upon her, . . . answered: 'Be it done unto me according to thy word.' And, indeed, she gave birth to Him, concerning whom we have shown so many passages of Scripture were written, and by whom God destroys both the serpent and those angels and men who have become like the serpent, but frees from death those who repent of their sins and believe in Christ.

St. Irenaeus, who lived in the same century, carried the analogy between Eve and the Blessed Virgin even further in his work *Against the Heretics.* After showing that the virgin Eve, through her disobedience, "was made the cause of death, both to herself and to the entire human race," he goes on to say that Mary, who was also a virgin, did, "by yielding obedience, become the cause of salvation, both to herself and the whole human race." Farther on in the same work, he calls Mary the "advocate" of Eve, and declares that "as the human race fell into bondage to death by means of a virgin, so is it rescued by a virgin; virginal disobedience having been balanced in the opposite scale by virginal obedience."

These two citations show clearly that as early as the year 200, our Blessed Mother was recognized to have a very definite relationship to the whole human race. That this relationship, in the minds of the early Christian writers, is one of causality is evident from the explicit statement of St. Irenaeus just quoted, and also from the same comparison of Eve with Mary as made by his contemporaries. In this comparison, they find three points of likeness and three points of divergence between Eve and the Blessed Virgin. The two matriarchs are alike in that 1) each was a virgin (for it is evident from the Book of Genesis that Eve did not know Adam carnally until after the fall); 2) each received a message: Eve the diabolical suggestion of the serpent, and Mary, the message of the angel Gabriel; 3) finally, each became a mother in relation to the whole human race. Here the likeness ends. The triple divergence lies 1) in the fact that Eve, in yielding to the serpent, disobeyed God's command, whereas Mary obeyed; 2) by her disobedience, Eve became the moral cause of Adam's sin, from which resulted the degradation of humanity: but Mary, by her obedience, became the cause of the Redeemer Who, in turn, restored human dignity; 3) lastly, the Apostolic Fathers speak of Eve as the author of death, and of Mary as the author of life.

In the third century, we find a further unfolding of Mary's place in the economy of salvation. In a work attributed to St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, entitled *First Homily on the Annunciation,* this sentence occurs:

"But in the holy Virgin alone is the fall of that (first mother) repaired." This ancient testimony, even though it possibly may not have come from the pen of the Wonderworker, does nevertheless bear witness to the early recognition of our Blessed Lady's singular position in the work of redemption. So, just a little more than two centuries after the Assumption, we have two fundamental notes of the doctrine of Mary's mediation implicitly established: namely, its universality and its uniqueness.

In the following (fourth) century, Saints Jerome and Epiphanius echo, in substance, a phrase which had already become the battle-cry of the early Church, MORS PER EVAM, VITA PER MARIAM! Indeed, the comparison between Eve and the Blessed Virgin has been taken up by practically every Mariologist down to the present day. However, there is no point in tracing this comparison any further, for in the same glorious fourth century we pass from the realm of implicit statements to an explicit declaration of Mary's universal mediation.

Use of the Term 'Mediatrix'

The earliest application of the term "mediatrix" to our Blessed Mother is found in the works of St. Ephrem, who died shortly before the year 380. Those who recite the Divine Office are familiar with the famous mediatrix passage which appears in the breviary as the fourth lesson of the feast of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mediatrix of All Graces. Here St. Ephrem prays:

> My mistress, most holy Mother of God and full of grace, inexhaustible sea of the divine and secret distribution of gifts, bestower of every good thing, mistress of all after the Trinity, a second consoler after the Paraclete, and, next to *the* Mediator, mediatrix of the whole world: behold my confidence and my divinely-inspired yearning . . . . through you, alone immaculate, is derived and shall be all glory, honor, and sanctity, from the first Adam himself all the way to the end of the world, to the Apostles, Prophets, to the just and humble; and in you, O full of grace, rejoices every creature.

Again, in his *Sermon on the Praises of the Virgin Mary,* St. Ephrem reiterates this title of mediatrix, addressing our Lady in these words:

> Hail, most excellent Mediatrix of God and men, hail most efficacious reconciler of the whole world.

Once the ground had been broken, subsequent ecclesiastical writers did not hesitate to use the term in speaking of the Blessed Virgin. In the fifth century, Basil of Seleucia calls her "mediatrix between God and men," and points out the proper function of her mediation: to tear down the walls of enmity, and bring together things of earth with those of heaven.

The next notable impetus in the development of the doctrine of Mary's mediation comes in the eighth century from the pen of St. Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople. His contribution is an emphatic insistence on Our Lady's exclusive prerogative as universal mediatrix after her Son. Again we go to the lessons of the feast of Mary Mediatrix, where we find the polished phrases of the Patriarch reproduced:

> Therefore, O Mother of God, in the procuring of salvation thy aid is potent, and of such a nature that no other mediator with God is necessary . . . . Thy gifts are without number. For no one attains to salvation without thee, O Most Holy One. No one, O Most Immaculate One, is delivered from evils except through thee. Except through thee, Most Chaste One, there is none who receives any favor.

St. Tarasius, who succeeded to the See of Constantinople late in the same century, corroborates the doctrine of his predecessor when he invokes the Blessed Virgin under the title of "mediatrix of all things which are under heaven," and as "repairer of the whole world."

Thus, we find that the first eight centuries of dogmatic development have furnished us with both implicit and explicit statements of our Blessed Mother's universal mediation. She is invoked under the title of Mediatrix, and also as Mediatrix between God and men. Later ecclesiastical writers speak of Mary as Mediatrix between Christ and men. St. Anselm, for example, writing at the end of the eleventh century, asks Mary—whom he addresses as "our Mediatrix"—to commend us to her Son, to reconcile us with Him, and to represent us to Him. St. Bernard, who closes the Patristic age, refers to the Blessed Virgin as "medium . . . between Christ and the Church." Both of these Doctors of the Church teach Mary's role as dispenser of all graces. St. Anselm sums it up in these words:

> If you (Mary) are silent, no one will pray, no one will help. But if you pray, all shall pray, all shall help.

St. Bernard, preaching on the Annunciation, says to our Lady:

> . . . on your word depends . . . the salvation of your entire race, of all the Children of Adam. Hasten, then, O Lady, to give your answer.

Teaching of St. Albert and St. Thomas

St. Albert the Great, though not a Father of the Church, deserves to be mentioned here because of his substantial contribution to Mariology. He frequently refers to the Blessed Virgin as Mediatrix, using terms as "universal medium and cause of peace," "universal mediatrix and reconciler," and "mediatrix of God and men." To help us understand the importance of Mary's mediation, he describes her as Christ's "helper," "coadjutrix," "companion," and he uses such colorful and traditional epithets as "canal" and "aqueduct" to illustrate her office of transmitting our prayers to God and bringing in return His grace to us. He borrows the term "aqueduct" from St. Bernard, adding:

> And that aqueduct is marvelous, because through it all the waters of grace flow down, and then flow back up through it.

As for the teaching of the Angelic Doctor on this point, ardent devotees of our Blessed Mother who, no doubt, will expect to find a thorough vindication of her universal mediation from the pen of St. Thomas, are doomed to disappointment. Neither in the *Summa* nor in any of his other genuine works is there an explicit statement of the doctrine. The term mediatrix occurs but once,—in Chapter II of his Commentary on St. John's Gospel,—and there it is used only for a particular case, to express Mary's part in the conversion of water into wine. However, St. Thomas does seem to teach her universal mediation in equivalent terms. For example, in his treatise on the Hail Mary, we find this striking passage:

> The plenitude of grace in Mary was such that its effects overflow upon all men. It is a great thing in a saint when he has grace to bring about the salvation of many, but it is exceedingly wonderful when grace is of such abundance as to be sufficient for the salvation of all men in the world; and this is true of Christ and the Blessed Virgin.

And in treating of the sanctification of Mary in the Third Part of the *Summa,* Q. 27, St. Thomas lays down the axiom that "the nearer a thing approaches its principle, the greater the part which it has in the effect of that principle," and then draws the following conclusion in the answer to the first objection of the fifth article:

> . . . the Blessed Virgin received such a fullness of grace that she was nearest of all to the Author of grace; so that she received within her Him Who is full of all grace; and by bringing Him forth, she, in a manner, dispensed grace to all.

The great theologian's conservative attitude in this matter, as in the case of the Immaculate Conception, is perhaps best explained by his cautious determination not to infringe on the unique prerogatives of Christ in order to exalt His Mother, who, as a creature, is infinitely beneath Him in dignity. Moreover, it must be remembered that the completeness of Mary's victory over the serpent was still a matter of dispute among the theologians of his day, since the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception had not yet been defined by the Church.

Conclusion

As a matter of fact, the definition of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 led to a great acceleration in the field of Mariology, both within and outside of the Thomistic School. Meditating upon the truth of Mary's absolute victory over Satan has led modern authors to see with increasing clearness our Blessed Mother's role in the economy of salvation. Drawing upon the analogy between Mary and Eve, they emphasize the Blessed Virgin's office as our co-redemptrix and spiritual mother. In fact, they assign to her a threefold office, paralleling the prerogatives of her divine Son. In the first place, corresponding to Christ's position as head of the Mystical Body, they see Mary to be our spiritual, adoptive mother. Secondly, they point out that Christ our Redeemer, as *principal* Mediator of all graces, has established His Mother as universal and *subordinate* Mediatrix of the same graces. Thirdly, to Christ's universal kingship they correlate Mary's unique place as Queen of heaven and earth.

It is only in this overall perspective that we can begin to grasp the full extent and importance of the Blessed Virgin's crucial function in the solution of our modern crises. There is more and more evidence that the Christian world is becoming truly Mary-minded. This is manifested on the part of the laity by the increasing numbers who daily visit her shrines. On the other hand, this Mary-mindedness on the part of the clergy is evidenced in the formal consecration of the world to her Immaculate Heart by the Pope and by many of the hierarchy. We can only guess at the unfathomed mysteries which still remain locked in this Immaculate Heart, but we are sure that no prayer addressed to her will ever go unanswered.

Martin Hopkins, O.P.

PHILOSOPHICAL WELLSPRINGS

PHILOSOPHERS are not really such strange people. And philosophy is not really as nebulous as you may think. After all, philosophy is nothing more than a study of man, the universe, morality, the arts, and God. In short, it is an attempt to understand everything that can be known. It is a feeble attempt to understand reality in order to live a fuller, more intelligent life. But, you may say, are not philosophers those people who absent-mindedly fall into ditches, or become abstracted in the midst of campaigns, or idly dream away in an arm chair while staring at the tree tops of Konigsberg? Not at all. Those are the people who started out looking at reality, but ended up looking at their dreams. And every philosophy which leaves reality behind is really a sham and an insult to human intelligence. Philosophy and day-dreaming have nothing in common except the individual who may indulge in either occupation. If you wish to be a philosopher, then you must look at reality and keep looking at it.

Aristotle and his great successors, Averroes, St. Albert, and St. Thomas, were not content to sit in an arm chair and ponder their dreams. They were, above all, realists and scientists in the strict sense of the word. Perhaps the wisest of all men, they were still most profoundly convinced of their ignorance. The realistic acceptance of their ignorance embarked these great philosophers on the infinite sea of knowledge. They wanted to know reality. They investigated everything with an avidity and precision beyond the comprehension of even modern science. Their investigations of nature, for example, were not fanciful deductions of interesting theories, as we sometimes hear. On the contrary, they tore reality apart trying to find reasons for that very reality they saw. And they rightly expected to find those reasons in reality itself; not in their imagination.

Object of Study Is Reality

The beginner as well as the professional philosopher should be fully convinced that the object of his study is reality. At the very beginning he should plant his feet firmly on solid ground and keep them there throughout all his speculations. Only by so doing can the arteries of his philosophy throb with the vitality of realism. In our day of contented dreamers perhaps nothing could be more practical than a consideration of the true founts and arteries of philosophy, the very realism which makes Aristotle so down-to-earth. We shall, therefore, consider first how the human mind naturally functions in investigating reality; for here is the heart of philosophical inquiry. Second, we shall consider how these natural functions are strengthened by intellectual habits, which are the vital arteries of philosophical knowledge. The blood of realism must be pumped into a natural, God-given mind, before it can flow through acquired perfections.

The human mind is essentially passive, that is, its activity begins with absorbing the evident realities of the senses, and its highest activity is measured by, and subject to, *reality.* The sensible and changing realities around us are quickly absorbed by the external senses and gathered together, collected by the cogitative power of man. Not only external realities, but internal states and consciousness itself are snatched up and masticated by the cogitative power. This highest of all sense faculties, frequently called the *ratio particularis* by the Scholastics and invariably called the "passive intellect" by Averroes, not only groups individual men in such a way as to apprehend the *quasi*-universal nature of man, but also formulates singular, concrete judgments in such a way that the agent intellect can illumine the true universality contained therein.[1] This is rather important, because we sometimes restrict abstraction to simple apprehensions, while in reality the most important abstractions the human mind makes concern *judgments.* All of the first judgments of reason have their sensible and analogical counterparts in the judgments of the cogitative faculty. Knowledge of one's own existence, of singular existence and existing things, knowledge that one thing is not another and that "one thing is not not-itself" are all known by the cogitative faculty.[2] Such judgments are potentially universal and intelligible. All that is required is an intellectual light, the light of the agent intellect, to illumine and actualize their universality. These judgments of the cogitative are, to use Aristotle's terminology, the source of all intellectual knowledge and artistic achievement.[3]

The Beginning of Inquiry

As long as the human mind is merely absorbing universals, as long as it merely accepts evident truths, philosophical inquiry has not yet begun. But sooner or later the mind gets a shock; its absorbing process is suspended. Perhaps it was in the Mesopotanian valley, or perhaps it was on the hills of India, but somewhere in antiquity a star-gazer began to wonder about the waning of the moon. He was surprised to see it it disappear completely one night and became fascinated by its antics. The rising and setting of the sun, the waning of the moon, and the change of seasons were perhaps the first phenomena to arouse man's curiosity. The observers of antiquity knew *that* at certain times moon did not give her light; they knew *that* the position of the stars changed, *that* the sun rose, gave light in the day, and set again. What surprised them was that they did not know WHY. Knowledge of the fact, or phenomenon

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[1] "Ex propositionibus universalibus provenientibus ab experientia aliquae sunt principia rerum speculativarum, et aliqua sunt principia rerum operativarum." Averroes, *Aristotelis Stagiritae Posteriorum Resolutionum,* lib. II, comm. 104, *Opera Omnia,* Venetiis 1574, t.I, P.II, fol. 564r. Cf. St. Thomas, *De Anima,* q.un.,a.4 ad 6; a.5.

[2] Cf. Averroes, *In II Post. Resolut.,* comm. 106, *ed. cit.,* fol. 566v.

[3] *II Post. Anal.,* c.19, 100a8; cf. St. Thomas, *ibid.,* lect. 20, n.11-14; *In I Metaph.,* lect. 1.

(ipsum quia) is not satisfying to the human mind if it has raised a question. The mind is in agony, as Avicenna says, until it can rest again—this time in the answer to WHY *(propter quid).* Surprise or shock at the unusual evokes a natural question. This question embarks the mind on an endless quest for the causes of things, for one plausible theory, or even a real answer, stirs up a host of other questions. Surprise or wonder causes the mind to ask why; and this, as Averroes and St. Albert so beautifully explain, is the beginning of philosophy, the beginning of scientific inquiry.[4]

The human mind naturally asks questions. It asks all kinds of questions, but not all of them are scientific questions. Only those questions are scientific in the strict sense of the word which are capable of demonstration. If I ask, "How many intellectual habits are there?", I cannot demonstrate anything. I can merely look and count. But if I ask, "Are there five intellectual habits?", I may be able to demonstrate that there are. If I ask the question, "How many?", my procedure is to investigate and count. If my mind is satisfied, I will stop right there with a mere knowledge of the fact. But invariably a problem arises; authorities may disagree on the number, or my observation may lead me to disagree with the number accepted by others. When I am faced with a *problem,* that is, probable reasons for accepting either side of a contradictory statement, I am forced to ask the scientific question: Are there only five? Why? And I will not be satisfied until I know the real reason and why it cannot be otherwise. But such certain knowledge obviously presupposes that we clearly grasp the precise nature of the phenomenon under observation, or its *quid sit,* as the Scholastics would say.

Four Scientific Questions

From what we have said it is easy to recognize the four kinds of scientific questions we can formulate. First, we can ask about the existence of something we are not too sure of, for example, Is there a human soul? This is the question *an est* of the subject considered. Second, we can and should inquire into its nature: Is the human soul that which makes a man to be what he is? This is the question *quid sit* of the subject. Third, we sometimes have to inquire into its properties: Is the human soul immortal, or does it die with the body? This kind of searching deals with a statement, or proposition of fact, *quia est talis.* And finally, we always want to know the exact reason for every statement, for example, Why should the human soul be immortal? The Scholastic philosophers called this question *propter quid.*

From a strictly logical point of view, questions *an est* and *quid est* lead to an understanding of simple essences, while questions *quia est* and *propter quid est* lead to knowledge of judgments. "Just as knowledge of the question *quia* is perfected by the question *propter quid,* so too knowledge of the *si est* or *an est* is perfected by knowledge of the question *quid est*."[5] However, considerations of the existence of subject or predicate, that is, questions *an est* and *quia est*, are not as different as may appear at first sight. In either case we want to know the *fact*. In our study of nature these facts of existence or phenomena are obvious to the senses and there is no need to ask such questions.[6] No sensible man wonders whether there is a universe or motion. But when the fact is not obvious to sense experience or immediate consciousness, we seek to establish the fact by some kind of medium: effect, remote cause, signs, etc. In other words, whenever we do have to ask *an est* or *quia est*, that is, whenever the fact itself (the existence of a subject, or inherence of a property) is unknown, we want to discover some reason for thinking that the fact does exist. This is not too commonly the case in natural philosophy. Only on the supposition that these facts must be demonstrated can we say with Aristotle that questions *an est* and *quia est* are actually an inquiry about "whether there is a medium of demonstration."[7]

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[4] St. Albert, *I Post. Anal.,* tr. II, cap. 1, Borgnet t.2, p. 22; *II Post. Anal.,* tr. I, cap. 1, pp. 155-158; cap. 3, pp. 163a-164.

On the other hand, questions *quid est* and *propter quid* are obviously an inquiry about the very nature of that medium.[8] When we know the fact we are not content until we know WHY. The wonder experienced in face of the unknown raises a question and we are in anguish until the mind can again rest in truth. Since the medium of all *propter quid* demonstrations is the definition, Aristotle conveniently reduces questions of *quid est* and *propter quid* to an inquiry into the true cause of the fact and proper medium of demonstration. Therefore the whole of scientific inquiry and investigation is concerned with finding the causes or reason WHY of reality. When we truly know the causes of anything, we really know its nature, its definition. "Thus," Aristotle says, "to know a thing's nature is to know the reason why it is."[9]

Following St. Thomas we can outline the reduction of these four scientific questions to the basic question *why* as follows:



Obviously, then, the whole of scientific investigation consists in looking for the causes of things, which from the logical point of view constitute the medium of demonstration, or means of certain knowledge. But for Aristotle the proper medium of demonstration lies in the definition: it is the same thing to know scientifically a phenomenon and its complete definition.[10] For this reason Aristotle and the Mediaeval Scholastics frequently conceived scientific procedure as lying ultimately in finding definitions, definitions which will be the medium of demonstration if you like, or more precisely, in finding the definition which differs from a logical demonstration only by the position of its terms.[11] The really important point to remember is that in Aristotle's mind the definition which is a medium of demonstration is the CAUSE or REASON for the known fact. When we say that scientific procedure consists in finding middle terms or finding definitions, we mean nothing more than that we want to know the true causes of things.

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[5] St. Albert, *II Post. Anal.*, tr. I, cap. 1, *ed. cit.*, p. 158b.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Aristotle, *II Post. Anal.*, c. 2, 89b37-90a2.

[8] Cf. St. Albert, *II Post. Anal.*, tr. I cap. 3, p. 162a.

[9] *Post. Anal.*, bk. *II*, c. 2, 90a32; cf. Averroes, *II Post. Resol.*, comm. 6, *ed. cit.*, fol. 403r-v.

The human intellect has a natural desire for logical truth, for truths of judgment. It has natural tendency to *rest* in its possession, in the evident sensible judgments abstracted from sense experience. A realization that there is something unknown provokes the mind. The unknown cannot satisfy the mind and natural questions are so many pin pricks to urge the mind on to fuller perfection—ultimately to a knowledge of God. As long as the human mind asks itself a question, it cannot rest. It is in anguish, as Avicenna says, until some answer can be found. Plausible explanations cannot truly satisfy, for they too contain difficulties and raise questions. Only the true answer known with certainty can satisfy the natural desire of the mind. Every scientist certainly wishes to know the true explanation of everything, but the simple truth is that he not infrequently fails. Ptolemy is right when he says that a man should not stuff his mind with probabilities and opinions because they do not satisfy the mind. However, the same writer wisely observes that a man is a fool who rejects conjectures when perfect knowledge cannot be had.[12] Probabilities are sometimes the best we can have and frequently they lead to certain, demonstrative knowledge.

The natural desire of the mind to know, to answer its own questions, to rest in the possession of logical truth is the basic fount and spring of scientific knowledge, for it urges a man on in the search of certain and even probable answers.[13]

Worlds of Thought

Here we must say a few words about the different worlds which the human mind sees and wonders about. Historically and psychologically our mind is first awakened by the sensible world around us. Its first questions are concerned with the wonderful beauty of the natural, sensible and changeable universe. Lunar phases and eclipses, movements of the sun and stars have fascinated the minds of men as far back in antiquity as we can go. But the real causes of natural phenomena are most difficult to ascertain and primitive thinkers sought plausible explanations in the antics of the gods animating or controlling the heavenly bodies. The sensible world evoked many questions, but certain, causal knowledge of this world is very difficult to obtain. And it has taken centuries for mankind to obtain the little it now possesses.

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[10] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.*, II, c. 2, 90a32.

[11] Cf. St. Thomas, *I Post. Anal.*, lect. 16, n. 4-5; lect. 26, n. 3.

[12] Ptolemy, *Almagest*, quoted by St. Albert in *Lib. de Praedicab.*, tr. I, cap. 6 Bornet tr. I, p. 14b and *I Post. Anal.*, tr. I, cap. 1 Borgnet t.II, p. 2b.

[13] St. Albert, *I Post. Anal.*, tr.II, cap.1, *ed. cit.*, p. 22a.

But men of antiquity soon became aware of another world, the world of numbers. From the very beginning of time men had to count apples, sheep, children, and so forth. The ease with which man can imagine numbers apart from particular objects, quickly brought him into contact with a new world for his thought. This world of numbers was very easy to handle, yet satisfying to the human mind because of its certainty. Man was certain that two taken away from six leaves four. The discovery of multiplication and division with many of its specialized applications brought arithmetic to a high state of perfection in India and Egypt long before the Greeks had time to speculate.

The abstract world of magnitudes was not far behind in development. Circles, triangles, quadrangles, etc. could be imagined much more perfectly than they existed in nature. The facility with which lines, surfaces, and figures could be compared and studied gave rise to goemetry, or the science of measuring, as Alfarabi calls it. Borrowing knowledge from the Oriental and Egyptian mathematicians, Pythagoras developed goemetry to a high degree before the natural philosophers of Greece took their study seriously.

Astronomy, as the ancients conceived it, is a mathematical-physical science, developing from the application of mathematics to celestial movements. Alfarabi rightly observes that "we cannot arrive at knowledge of any of these movements except by means of the two preceeding arts, namely arithmetic and geometry, without which it is not only difficult to attain a knowledge of them, but even impossible."[14]

The creative instincts of man and the necessity of making things as well as doing things introduced the mind to an infinite number of productive worlds. The desire to know how to make instruments and how to make the best object both for utility and pleasure inaugurated the arts—a new and vastly different field of knowledge. The necessity of living in peaceful society and attaining happiness urged thinkers to study the best and necessary means to happiness and the good life.

Mathematical and artistic, that is, creative knowledge aided considerably in the investigation of nature. The study of the sensible, corporeal, changing world quickly brought men's minds to the recognition of some unchangeable, incorporeal, separated being as the only possible explanation of change. The human soul itself is in a sense separated from nature; because being spiritual it is not, strictly speaking, subject to natural generation and corruption.

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[14] Alfarabi, *De Ortu Scientiarum,* cap.3, in *Beitrage z. Gesch. d. Philos. d. M.A.,* Band 19, heft 3, Munster 1916, pp. 18-19.

The realization of beings separated from the sensible and changeable world of "nature" opened a whole new field for human investigation—the study of separated beings, of analogical notions common to both, and therefore, as such, "separated" from the corporeal world. It is the divine science which seeks to know something about substance as such, existence, and the cause of existing substances, the First Substance.

Scientific Method

There is still another world which Aristotle was quick to recognize and develop — the world of scientific method itself, the instrument or ORGANON of scientific investigation. This is the world of unreal being, of logical being. The extreme difficulty as well as the absolute necessity of accurate procedure in studying objective reality forced Aristotle and numberless Oriental metaphysicians to reflect upon the mind's own natural method of seeking out truth. They sought to analyze the natural necessity of the mind in going from known to unknown with only one purpose in mind: to show the *general* method every science must follow in order to know the WHY or REASON of known truths. Logic studies the general method of proceeding accurately from known to unknown, from question to answer, from fact to cause. This in no way derogates from the particular method proper to each science. A general method such as logic cannot treat what is particular; it remains with each particular science to recognize its proper method and with the general science of metaphysics to point out and defend the method peculiar to each science.

The obvious diversity of these knowable worlds, the sensible, the imaginable, separated, and logical, need not detain us here. But what is not so obvious is how each of these worlds achieves a unity and distinction apart from all the others. Do the various objects under consideration constitute different sciences? Does each specifically different reality require a science differing in object, method, and certitude from the study of every other specifically different reality; or are they resolved and synthesized into a generic world for scientific investigation?

Most of the Aristotelian terminology concerning intellection and intellectual habits is obtained from an analogy to vision. Unless we understand this analogy carefully much of the profundity of Aristotelian and Mediaeval thought will escape us.

We know that we have only one faculty for seeing. Yet we see many specifically different colors, red, yellow, blue. The unity of vision lies in the unity of its generic object, color, which embraces all the various kinds. If all the primary and secondary colors were arranged in a kind of Porphyrian tree, they would all be ultimately reduceable to the category of color as the ultimate genus, the ultimate cause. Whether you look at red, green, or blue, you still see color; and this is the adequate, total object of vision. Thus the unity of vision fundamentally lies in the unity of its generic object, its adequate object *quod*.

Knowledge is finding and knowing the causes of reality. But the immediate and proximate cause of a thing is not fully and perfectly known until we reduce our knowledge back to an ultimate, generic cause, beyond which we cannot go.[15] St. Albert gives the example of man. The immediate formal causes of man are rational and animal. But we cannot fully understand the meaning of animal unless we push our thinking back to substance, that is, corporeal substance. There is nothing beyond substance in the order of formal causality except being as such, which is merely analogical and proportional grouping. Therefore, St. Albert remarks, all questions concerning the sensible world, nature, must be reduced to some first formal cause, the ultimate genus, whence the study of nature *per se* arises and in which it is unified.[16] In other words, the innumerable objects in the sensible universe are ultimately resolvable to the generic unity of *sensible bodies in motion,* or *nature and activity.* Of course, color as such does not exist in the world; and neither does nature and activity as such. But they are most real. And just as the generic object of vision is color as such, so too the generic object of physical investigation is nature with its activity. All eight books of Aristotle's *Physics* are concerned with this one generic object: nature (the subject of activity) and motion. Everything which the naturalist studies is basically a sensible body with activity. Regardless of the kind of body studied, it is still ultimately resolvable into the fact that it is a nature having motion. The formal object *quod* of natural science, therefore, is not *ens mobile,* but *ens mobile,* changeable, sensible, natural being, *with activity.* Mobile being is merely the ultimate *generic SUBJECT* of activity.

Here would be a good place to incorporate our observations on scientific investigation with the method of natural philosophy. Our senses observe particular kinds of being with peculiar activity. We raise no question of existence *(an sit)* or fact *(quia est),* for these are immediately known to the senses. But our curiosity does want to know the WHY of this phenomenon. The moon is eclipsed. We want to know why. The intellect works back in every order of causality, driving its understanding of intrinsic causes back to *nature* and *motion.* It sees that the ultimate explanation of all nature's activity must be found in an incorporeal, separated, unmoved mover — a being which is above the natural order. When the intellect finds the real cause of existence *(in essendo)* of, let us say, an eclipse, it returns to the fact or conclusion now known scientifically through a medium of demonstration *(causa in cognoscendo).*[17] In other words, the method of natural philosophy is a process of resolving, of searching back to causes and *then* returning in the so-called deductive or syllogistic process to the conclusion. The burden of natural philosophy consists in *finding* all the causes of natural phenomena, in *finding* all the proper principles. Natural philosophy does not deduce all of its conclusions from a few basic principles, but rather it tries to find the reasons for observed phenomena. And this can be done only by further observation and experimentation.

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[15] Cf. Averroes, *I Post. Resol.*, comm. 70, *ed. cit.*, fol. 155r-v; comm. 166, 352r-354r.

[16] St. Albert, *II Physicorum*, tr. II, cap. 9, Borgnet t. 3, p. 137a; cf. Averroes, *II Phys.*, comm. 26, Venetiis 1574, IV, fol. 59r.

[17] Averroes, *I Post. Resol.*, comm. 8, *ed. cit.* fol. 30v-31r.

The other sciences likewise find their fundamental unity in the generic simplicity of subject and property. Arithmetic is unified in the generic notion of number; it studies numerical subjects and numerical properties. Geometry is unified in the generic notion of magnitudes. Metaphysics on the other hand, is unified in substance as such, substance realized in sensible and separated beings. And logic is unified in the generic notion of method, second intentions.

It may be well for us to summarize our observations on scientific investigation before proceeding to intellectual habits by which the mind is perfected in its search for truth. All human knowledge begins with sense experience. The intellect is first perfected by evident truths which it accepts from the cogitative power. But suddenly questions arise about the reasons, about the causes of reality. The mind seeks to know why. Scientific investigation must begin with evident truths of knowledge and seek out the causes. When the causes are clearly, intuitively, inductively known, then causal and scientific knowledge can be had of the conclusion. But very frequently causes are not or cannot be found and the mind must be satisfied with probabilities, theories, hypotheses, statistics, etc. Scientific investigations are most evidently unified in the generic field investigated, that is, in the generic subject and generic phenomena or properties. Generically different subects evidently diversify scientific investigation in object, method, and certitude. Every science must pursue its investigations to the ultimate causes in its own proper field, although the ultimate cause without the proximate causes reveals very little about the thing we wish to know. Sensible substance tells us little about man, but we cannot understand man unless we know that he is a sensible substance.

Intellectual Habits

Obviously, the human mind finds great difficulty in understanding reality, in attaining truth. True, the intellect is sufficiently adapted to its own proper object, the *per se nota* principles of reason and evident truths of sense experience. But the mind does not find itself at home with the other truths it accepts with more or less good reason. Many of man's truths are accepted on faith, others with greater or less probability, still others are known with certainty but by means of better known truths. Actually there are many dispositions which the mind can and does acquire to feel at home with truths and investigations of truths beyond its own proper object. But not all of these dispositions merit the name of intellectual *habits* in the strict sense of the term.

Habits, as Aristotle understood them, are acquired dispositions which elevate and adapt a faculty toward activity for which it is not sufficiently disposed by nature. They give the faculty a connaturality, an affinity, an ease for performing functions in a sense beyond its first nature. The important point to remember is that these dispositions are real superadded *powers*, dynamic, vital channels by which the faculty is evelated and coadapted and made commensurate with difficult activities. The whole necessity for acquired habits lies in the indetermination, passivity, or sluggishness of the natural faculty.[18] This passivity or indetermination must be overcome by some active element sufficient to mold and adapt the faculty to a higher and more perfect way of operating. Appetitive habits are acquired through a long and continued process of molding the appetites into rational subjection. Intellectual habits, on the other hand, are acquired in an imperfect state by a clear perception of the truth. One demonstration in natural philosophy is sufficient to acquire the habit of this science in an imperfect state. But our observations on the nature of intellectual habits should be formed by considering their *perfect* state. When we do consider intellectual habits in a perfect state, we are struck by their amazing dynamism. A man who has the science of nature in a perfect state has a vital power and connatural affinity for viewing the sensible universe in a very definite way, for penetrating into its proper causes, and for seeing its harmonious order and unity. The same is true of the various mathematical sciences and wisdom. Even dialectics displays a surprising vitality in the dialogues of Plato.

Before discussing the intellectual habits in particular we should point out the highly specialized use of the word 'habit' in Aristotelian terminology. Enumerating the various kinds of quality, Aristotle sees that the first kind (first, because it directly disposes nature) embraces 'habit' and 'disposition'. Used in this sense habit and disposition are two irreducible species of disposition generically taken.[19] "Habit", says Aristotle, "differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established."[20] Simplicius, commenting upon the Praedicaments of Aristotle, says that they differ essentially as they are difficult or easy to move. Arabian and Scholastic writers have always understood this in the sense of an *objective immobility* arising from the object, or formal cause of the habit.[21] In other words, scientific knowledge stems from objective and immobile proper principles: objective, eternal, necessary, and clearly known principles illuminating conclusions. Opinion, on the other hand, arises from probable and dialectical principles; such principles are not necessary and immobile and cannot beget habits in the strict sense of the word. This highly specialized use of the word 'habit' excludes the innumerable powers of opinion, theorizing, and dialectical reasoning besides the highly necessary dispositions in the imagination, memory, and cogitative faculty — and they are innumerable![22] Only intellectual knowledge which rests in objective, necessary and immobile causes can be perfected by intellectual habits in the strict sense.

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[18] Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica,* I-II, q. 49, a. 4.
[19] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 49, a. 2 ad 3.
[20] Arist., *Categoriae,* c. 8, 8b27.
[21] St. Thomas, *Sum. Theo., I-II,* q. 49, a. 2 ad 3.
[22] *Ibid.,* I-II, q. 50, a. 3 ad 3.

Auxiliary Dispositions

Although demonstrative knowledge alone can merit the strict meaning of science, we should not overlook the great number of auxiliary dispositions and powers which aid the intellect in its arduous pursuit of truth.

Let us look briefly at some of these auxiliary dispositions involved in a single scientific habit of the mind. First, there is the understanding of *per se nota* principles and evident facts of sense experience. These self-evident principles of reason are the proper object of the human intellect and, therefore, the common possession of all men. But scientific investigation begins when we wish to go beyond such principles and seek out the causes of reality. Dialectical reasoning, theorizing, gathering of data and probabilities all assist in acquiring a real facility and power which Aristotle calls opinion. The perception of even one true cause of reality initiates the habit of science in the strict sense. Familiarity with the field gradually begets *solertia,* or a quick-mindedness in perceiving middle terms, as well as a kind of 'sagacity' in the cogitative for yielding causes and principles; it begets a certain 'ingenuity' in the imagination for seeing similarities. All these powerful dispositions aid in acquiring the perfect vitality of science, which sees order and embraces everything in its orderly growth. The spark of genius lies not so much in the habit of science as in the auxiliary dispositions, especially in solertia and sagacity.

Although 'science' directly designates the demonstrative habit, the term can and should be extended to embrace all the auxiliary habits in a proportional and attributional unity. Probable knowledge concerning the sensible universe and connected with the science of natural philosophy deals with the same field of investigation and utilizes the same method. If every demonstrated truth, every bit of strictly scientific knowledge, were extracted from Aristotle's works, we would have nothing but a very small pamphlet. In other words, knowledge proper to the habit of science is very meager and no text-book or professor can restrict himself to teaching syllogisms. When we talk about natural philosophy, we mean not only demonstrative knowledge, but also experiments, probabilities, theories, and opinions concerning natural phenomena. Nevertheless when we discuss the objects, nature, unity, and diversity of the sciences, our judgments should be drawn from the perfect habit of science existing in a perfect state.

Aristotle enumerated five general classes of intellectual habits: *intellectus* (nous), *scientia* (episteme), *ars* (techne), *prudentia* (phronesis), and *sapientia* (sophia).[23] These five were probably currently accepted in Aristotle's day. Science, art, and prudence were certainly accepted as intellectual habits by Socrates; and Plato constantly stresses the preferability of understanding and wisdom to mere *episteme.* Generally speaking, this fivefold division is adequate and exhaustive. But at present we are not concerned with all five of them, nor with the adequacy of Aristotle's enumeration. Although all five classes of intellectual habits make up what we call philosophy, let us consider the three which are most intimately connected with philosophy; understanding, science, and wisdom.

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[23] *I Post. Anal.,* c. 33; VI *Ethic,* c. 3; *I Mag. Moral.,* c. 35; *II Moral Eudem.,* c. 6.

Intellectus

Intellectus, or nous, is spoken of very frequently by Aristotle as the habit of first principles of scientific knowledge.[24] Yet this traditional definition is not as illuminating or as simple as it may seem at first sight. What principles is Aristotle talking about, common or proper? Is it a superadded habit or is it innate, as St. Thomas frequently implies? Is it one habit or many? Some Thomists claim one habit for speculative principles and another for practical, called synderesis. Others claim one habit for common principles and another for the proper principles of each science. Yet others, as John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, and Complutenses, maintain one habit for all principles, common, proper, speculative, and practical.

Actually, when Aristotle makes his frequent references to NOUS, he is not so much concerned with giving its exact nature as he is with solving Plato's problem in the *Meno.* How can anyone inquire into the unknown? If he does not already know what to look for, he will never know when he has found it; but if he already knows, there is no need to inquire. Plato sees only one solution: we do not really learn anything new, but merely recall what we once knew from a previous existence. Plato rejects all true scientific investigation and substitutes a doctrine of mere remembering. Besides considering the general method of all scientific analysis, Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* is an answer to Plato's rejection of demonstrative knowledge. Aristotle, the realist, begins by telling us that demonstrative knowledge most certainly is possible. Admittedly, we do not know all the answers to our questions; but we look for those answers in the light of what we already know—principles of investigation. Aristotle ends his refutation by showing that such knowledge preexistent to investigation is not innate but acquired from the cogitative power, that is, from sense knowledge. Thus scientific investigation is possible because NOUS is merely the beginning of knowledge and a light into the unknown.

The Arabian commentators and St. Albert seem to have restricted NOUS to the understanding of first common principles, the proper object of the human mind. St. Albert says, "The science of conclusions is produced in us by the intellectual perception of these principles; and in this regard one science does not differ from another."[25] And there is no reason in Aristotle or any of the ancient writers for conceiving this habit as something over and above the intelligible species. The whole of St. Thomas' commentary on the Sixth Book of the *Ethics* implies that the intelligible species themselves constitute the so-called *habitus* of first common principles. The natural power of reason is itself sufficiently disposed for eliciting its proper act and does not need any habit, beyond the intelligible species, to elevate and adapt it to its proper activity.

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[24] *Post. Anal.,* bk. I, ch. 33.

[25] St. Albert, *II Post. Anal.,* tr. V, cap. 2, Borgnet t. 2, p. 232a; cf. *I Post. Anal.,* tr. I, cap. 2, p. 5b; tr. I, cap. 3, pp. 8b-9a.

This, however, is not the case with proper principles of scientific knowledge, principles *per se nota sapientibus,* as the Scholastics call them.[26] These proper principles of science are difficult to find and are perceived only by the "learned". It is these principles the natural philosopher wants to find; these are the reasons, the causes he seeks in his methodical investigations and experiments. Quite probably a superadded power is needed to grasp the first proper principles of science. In which case an evidently distinct habit would be required for each particular science.

Scientia

Scientia, or episteme, is clearly a habit of conclusions, or a habit for knowing truths by means of demonstration. The natural process by which this habit is acquired, and the mental process which is perfected by this habit is syllogistic reasoning. Whenever we discuss the nature of the scientific habit, we should keep in mind that we obtain our understanding of habits by examining their proper acts; and the proper act of science is syllogistic, or deductive reasoning. However, we should be careful not to confuse the habit with reasoning itself; we should not, as Cajetan so emphatically explains, identify the habit of science with the intelligible species.[27] The intelligible species, even ordered in syllogistic fashion, are as the material element in the habit of science. The scientific habit itself is a vital power which elevates the mind, "rendering it apt for ordering other intelligible species in relation to its proper object".[28] The habit in a perfect state gives new life to the intellect in helping it to see truths through causes, to see reasons for things.

Every scientific habit has a distinct vitality, a unique modality, which it derives from proper principles. The understanding of these principles is immediate and intuitive, although their acquisition is a difficult process. Nevertheless, our knowledge of conclusions depends upon and derives its vitality from first principles proper to that particular science. For example, in the world of nature a lunar eclipse is evidently known by sense experience. We accept the *fact* without proof. But our curiousity urges us on to find out why this phenomenon occurs. Through observation and experimentation we discover that every opaque body cuts off light, even reflected light. This fact, too, is obvious and immediately known once it is realized. But by means of this immediate knowledge we know *why* the moon is eclipsed; we now know the reason, the cause of lunar eclipses. To know that eclipse is *caused by t*he interposition of the earth is scientific, mediate, demonstrated knowledge. Scientific knowledge is always mediate. By discovering the cause, by knowing it as the cause of a particular effect and that it cannot be otherwise we have scientific knowledge of reality. We should remember, however, that we have scientific knowledge of reality through any or all of the four kinds of causes.

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[26] Boethii, *De Hebdomadibus,* PL 64 1311; Gilberti Porret., *Comm. in Boeth.,* PL 64 1316-17.

[27] Cajetan, *In Sum. Theol.,* I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. VI-IX.

[28] *Ibid.,* n. IX.

The habit of *intellectus,* therefore, is properly concerned with acquiring and perceiving true, immediate, proper principles of reality. It is acquired by laborious experimentation and induction which never ceases, but ever grows in our pursuit of truth. The habit of *scientia,* on the other hand, is properly concerned with seeing reality through its causes. It is reality seen in the light of causes and principles responsible for making reality what it is. This scientific knowledge is manifested in syllogistic form, in demonstrative reasoning. Thus the understanding of proper principles and scientific knowledge are commensurate and correlative; true science depends upon true perception of proper principles. Yet we should observe Aristotle's statement that it is very difficult for us to know whether we actually know through proper principles or common principles, in which case our knowledge is not *scientia* but opinion.[29]

Sapientia

Unique among all the intellectual habits is *sapientia,* or sophia. It is really the highest of all the sciences, yet the specification of this habit is most emphatically different from the specification of other sciences. Wisdom is more than a mere universal science, the highest of all; it is essentially contemplative and intuitive knowledge of every single thing through the First Cause of all being. More properly, wisdom works the other way around. We contemplate the First Being through all the finite things we know as beings. While the other sciences are distinct from their first proper principles and derive their specification from them, wisdom itself formally embraces both immediate and mediate knowledge. Wisdom formally and eminently, as Cajetan explains, contains the functions of both understanding and science.[30] The common principles of human reason are synthesized into the higher unity of wisdom and actually become the proper principles of such wisdom. The higest act of wisdom is natural contemplation: an intuition of the first principle of being through the principles of human reason.

If we over emphasize the scientific roles of wisdom, we not only fail to grasp the more important sapiential roles of wisdom, but we are likely to misconceive the unique specification and unity of this habit. The formal subject of metaphysics is not evident to human understanding as Scotus believed, but must be found. The true point of departure for metaphysics is the discovery of separated substances in the study of nature.[31] The natural philosopher looks at the sensible universe and soon realizes that it is not self-explanatory. Motion presupposes a mover, and this mover cannot be material, for this explains nothing. But if there are such immaterial substances, we want to know about them. The only principles by which the human mind can investigate this new world of substance, or being as such, are the first principles of human reason extended analogically to grasp something of this "supra-natural" world. Such a science is indeed beyond the realm of human conventionality, as Aristotle said; it is a divine science! Its method of investigation is as different from mathematics as the method of mathematics is different from that of natural science. Not only does one sin, as St. Thomas says, who tries to proceed uniformly in every science, but he betrays a serious misunderstanding of the diversity of human knowledge.[32]

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[29] Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* bk. I, ch. 9, 76a26-30; St. Thomas, lect. 18, n. 1.
[30] Cajetan, *In Sum. Theol.,* I-II, p. 57, a. 2.
[31] Averroes, *In II Physicorum,* comm. 26, Venetiis 1574, t. IV, fol. 59r.

Conclusion

All these intellectual habits and many more help us in understanding reality. The more perfectly we possess and develop such habits, the more delightfully and securely will we advance in our pursuit of truth. Years of patient study and careful thinking are required to develop intellectual habits into perfect, dynamically real powers. Once they are possessed in a perfect state they operate with a certain dynamism beyond the comprehension of those who do not possess them. That man is the true philosopher!

Philosophy, we have said, is the study of reality. Everything which can be known by the human mind comes under the all embracive name of philosophy in some way or other. Even the fine arts, morality, and politics belong to philosophy inasmuch as they help to make us better realists. Mathematics does not tell us much about reality, but it is helpful in our understanding of nature. A study of nature which does not lead to metaphysics and God is not realistic; it has lost contact with reality.

No, philosophers are not such strange people. They are motivated by a common curiosity, the desire to find the real reason in and behind things. They are men who ask normal questions, but who cannot rest until they have found the answer. In the light of what they know, they peer into the darkness. Suddenly they hit upon the answer; they discover the reason. Quite normally they are highly delighted, for now they know WHY. Reality is understood and grasped in the light of its true causes. But instead of sitting back in an arm chair, they know only too well that they have thousands of questions which can be answered only by further investigation, observation, and careful experimentation. Fortunately the study of reality is not like pulling teeth. Practice and experience makes the acquisition of truth ever easier, for the natural processes of the mind are more and more perfected by habitual dispositions. These intellectual habits are real powers which facilitate the investigation, discovery, and perception of principles, as well as the scientific appreciation of reality. They give the mind a great facility, a delightful connaturality, and a powerful dynamism throbbing with the blood of realism. Everyone is equipped to begin philosophy, for all possess the founts of philosophical knowledge: curiosity and a natural method for finding answers. But only those men can be called philosophers who possess a connaturality, a dynamic affinity for investigating and understanding reality. If your ideas of reality are a bit shaky, it is time to go back to the fount and start developing vital arteries for a wholesome philosophy.

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[32] St. Thomas, *In Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2.

James Athanasius Weisheipl, O.P.

HEART OF THE GOD-MAN

SOME AUTHORS hold that from our vantage point in history we can look back and say that devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus began with the Apostle St. John who leaned upon the breast of Our Lord at the last supper. In the middle of the thirteenth century this apostle appeared during Matins of his feast-day to a Benedictine mystic of Saxony, St. Gertrude the Great, showed her the wounded heart of Christ, and taught her the great benefits deriving from devotion to this "holy of holies . . . in which are hidden all the treasurers of happiness."

"Why, then," St. Gertrude asked him, "have you kept such absolute silence about this, that you have never written anything, however little it might be, that would make it understood, at least for the profit of our souls?"

The Evangelist of Divine Love replied: "My mission was to deliver to the Church, in her first age, a simple word on the uncreated Word of God the Father that would suffice until the end of the world to satisfy the understanding of the whole human race, yet without any person ever succeeding in fully understanding it. But to tell of the sweetness of these beatings (of the Heart of Christ) has been reserved for the present time, so that in hearing of these things the world that is growing old and whose love for God is growing cold may be revived." Our liturgy says of St. John that he "drank of the gushing waters of the Gospel at the sacred fountain of the divine Heart."

Indications from Scripture

But apart from this private revelation, we would not have been able to discover the devotion to the Sacred Heart in the gospel words about St. John leaning on the breast of Our Lord. We must accept the conclusion of Abbé Thomas that "neither in the first ages of Christianity nor in holy Scripture do we find either the name or the complex idea of devotion to the Sacred Heart." But we can "at least discover in them, scattered here and there, the truths of which we now hold the synthesis. To deny, indeed, that the main idea of our devotion was of real antiquity would be to disregard history. But if we tried to trace this cult, in its present form, to a period when its existence was not even thought of, we should fall into just as great an error." The Abbé is referring particularly to the Old Testament, but what he says applies equally to the New, and also to the writings of the Fathers where certain references to the Heart of Christ are brought forth, e.g. SS. Justin Martyr, Chrysostom, Augustine, Gregory the Great, Bede, Anselm, and Bernard.

Here are some of the chief scriptural texts frequently referred to as touching on devotion to the Most Sacred Heart: in the book of Proverbs of Solomon (23:26) we read: "My son, give me your heart; and let your eyes keep my ways."

Isaiah (12:3) prophesied to the Jews poetically that one day thanks would be given to Elohim for the great benefit of redemption wrought through His Messiah: "you shall draw waters with joy out of the fountains of the Savior." We know now that these fountains of life-giving water spring up from the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

In the Song of Songs (4:9) the Beloved, who is Christ, says: "you have wounded my heart, my sister, my spouse. . .", and the Shulamite maiden, who can stand for the Church as the spouse of Christ or for any Christian soul, says in a response to her lover: "Put me as a seal upon your heart, as a seal upon your arm; for love is strong as death. . . ." (3:6)

And, prophetically enough, the Preacher of the Old Testament, Jesus, the son of Sirach, proclaimed in his meditations on the worth of the pursuit of Wisdom (Ecclus. 6:37): "Let your thoughts be about the precepts of God, and meditate continually upon His commands, and He will give you a *heart;* and the desire of Wisdom shall be given to you."

Limiting ourselves to but one text from the New Testament, we choose a sermon of our Savior's in which He issued an invitation to all peoples at the very beginning of His public career: "Come to me, all you who labor and are burdened, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart; and you will find rest for your souls." (Matt. 11:28-30)

We could say that these scriptural sources insinuate the devotion to the Sacred Heart, or contain the elements of this devotion (the physical heart of Christ as a symbol of His Love) implicitly but not explicitly.

Evolution of This Devotion

Devotion to the Sacred Heart evolved slowly and beautifully, under the guidance of Divine Providence, from devotion to the Wound in the Side of Christ which is the portal through which we must stoop to enter the "meek and humble" heart of our Crucified Master.

The first work to contain all the elements required to qualify as the devotion we know is the anonymous *Mystic Vine* now generally attributed to St. Bonaventure. Even if St. Bonaventure did not write this work, there are definite traces of the devotion in his *De Perfectione Vitae.*

But it was to the Belgian Cistercian nun, St. Lutgarde, and the Cistercian nuns of the convent of Helfta, St. Gertrude and St. Matilda, that the great revelations of the middle ages regarding the Heart of Jesus were first given.

St. Lutgarde, the Cistercian (1182-1246), had the Dominican, Thomas of Cantimpre, as her spiritual director. Like his client, Thomas was a Belgian. Born near Brussels of a noble of Brabant in 1201, he became a great philosopher and theologian in an era of masters. Having been a disciple of St. Albert the Great at the University of Paris, Thomas then became a professor at the University of Louvain. Later he was made a Preacher General in his Order because of the great work which he accomplished for the church in the apostolate of the pulpit. After the death of St. Lutgarde, he wrote the biography of his spiritual daughter. This work has been recently redone by the Cistercian, Thomas Merton, in *What Are These Wounds?*

In the last half of the thirteenth century, the Cistercian convent of Helfta, in Saxony, was a model convent of religious, zealously devoted to sacred study and prayerfully striving after perfect sanctity in contemplation. Father Richstaetter, S.J. in his book, *Illustrious Friends of the Sacred Heart of Jesus,* has eloquently described their life:

> The Sisters, well instructed in Latin and encouraged by their Abbess, read St. Augustine and St. Jerome, St. Gregory and St. Bede, St. Bernard and Hugo of St. Victor. The learning of St. Thomas Aquinas and Blessed Albertus Magnus excited their admiration. (p. 89)

But the writings of these two Dominican doctors was not their only source of influence from the Order of Preachers:

> As the father of their Order, next to St. Benedict, they honoured St. Bernard. Their souls were cared for by learned sons of St. Dominic from the neighboring Friary of Halle. We can therefore understand how in Helfta the dignified splendour of the Benedictine Liturgy united with the tender Jesus-mysticism of St. Bernard and the Passion-mysticism of the Dominican Order, to create works which will be for all time among the most beautiful productions of mystic lore. (p. 88)

St. Dominic Influences the Helfta Mystics

Actually there are two Saint Matilda's connected with the thirteenth-century development of devotion to the Heart of Christ, though only one is generally referred to. The first Matilda (of Madgeburg, 1212-1280) was a Beguine in her home town before she joined the nuns of Helfta. It was at the command of her Dominican spiritual director that she set down in writing the mystical revelations given her by Our Lord. On St. Dominic's feast day as she was praying for the whole Order of Preachers to whom she felt herself greatly indebted, Our Lord said to her: "Two things I love in the Order of Preachers, so that My Divine Heart is specially and unceasingly inclined towards them. One is the holiness of their life, the other is the great service they do for Christendom."

The other Matilda is St. Matilda of Hackeborn (1241-1298), the teacher of St. Gertrude the Great. This Matilda was head of the convent school at Helfta and sister of the abbess. St. Gertrude wrote down the revelations granted St. Matilda. One day, in showing her gratitude for her Dominican spiritual advisors, she was praying for one of the Preaching Brothers when Our Lord said to her: "I have chosen him for Myself and he shall be mine for all eternity. Wherever he may be, I will lead him and will cooperate in all his labors. I will be his protector, consoler, and the procurator of the convent in which he lives. When he preaches, My Heart will be in his mouth as a sounding trumpet, the source of all his words; when he teaches, My Heart shall be his book."

When St. Matilda was praying for a different Dominican on another day, Our Lord said: "I have left Myself to his will. I will never strike a sinner against his will, and to all those for whom he prays I will give the grace for which he begs. As a light feather carried away by the wind gets caught in the liquid balm, so will his soul be bound fast to My Divine Heart."

As we have indicated at the beginning of this article, St. Matilda's disciple, St. Gertrude the Great (1256-1334), had revelations of her own from the Sacred Heart which made an important contribution to the devotion. In her book, *The Ambassador of Divine Love,* she records that someone who had acquired great experience in the spiritual life counselled her to perpetually honor the Heart of the Crucified, burning with love. We may safely conclude that this advice came from a Dominican who was the appointed confessor for her convent, especially since the direction given accords perfectly with Dominican ascetical teaching.

Our Lord one day said to St. Gertrude: "See My Heart—let it be your church; then go through the other parts of My body, and arrange for the other parts of a monastery . . . for I desire that henceforth My Sacred Humanity should be your cloister." "Lord," replied St. Gertrude, "I know not now to seek or choose, for I have found such sweetness in Your Heart, which You have given me as an oratory, that I cannot find either rest or refreshment out of it—two things which I cannot do without."

"If you so choose," Our Lord answered, "you can find even these two things in My Heart; have you not heard that there are persons who never leave My house even for food or rest, like St. Dominic?" Here we have Our Divine Master Himself giving testimony in a private revelation to the constant tradition concerning our holy father, St. Dominic, viz. that he spoke only of God or to God.

Preaching of the Dominicans

According to Father Richstaetter, S.J., (*loc. cit.* p. 115) the preaching of the mystics of the Dominican Order became of far greater importance for the furthering of devotion to the Divine Heart during the middle ages than did even the great revelations vouchsafed their spiritual daughters, the Cistercian mystics whom they guided. Our authority confirms his statement thus:

> Illustrious names can be mentioned from the Order of Preachers. Blessed Albert the Great, Master Eckhart, John Tauler, and Blessed Henry Suso. They laboured from the end of the thirteenth till the middle of the fourteenth century, as writers, preachers, and directors of souls. Their influence was still further increased by the wide dissemination of the Order. When in 1303 Saxony was formed into a separate Province, the German Province of the Order numbered forty-six friaries and more than seventy convents of nuns, in which, as in many Cistercian convents, the Dominicans had care of souls of the inmates. Even today, after five hundred years, we can count about ten convents of Dominican nuns in Germany as witnesses to the devotion to the Heart of Jesus. This is, without doubt, to be attributed to the influence of their preachers and directors. This influence extended also to the devout-minded "Friends of God," who in the world were striving after perfection, aye and even to other Orders.

The saintly Margareta Ebner is the best known of the many Dominican nuns who practiced true interior devotion to the Sacred Heart of our Divine Savior, and who widely spread abroad the devotion by their writings. She died in 1351 and her cause for canonization has been introduced.

We ought to call to mind here the significance of the exchange of hearts which took place between Christ and the Dominican tertiary, St. Catherine of Sienna (1347-1380), and which was repeated in the life of St. Catherine de Ricci (1522-1590), a contemplative nun of the second order of St. Dominic.

Although space does not permit more than a mention of the contribution to devotion towards the Sacred Heart made by such illustrious Dominicans as Blessed Henry Suso, Johannes Tauler, Savonarola, St. Vincent Ferrer, and Venerable Louis of Grenada, yet we could not pass over a very significent sermon of Master Eckhart, O. P., (1260-1327), the teacher of Tauler and Suso.

When preaching on the sufferings of our Savior, Eckart said: ". . . with such fire did our Lord Jesus Christ burn on the Cross. For His Heart burned like a fire and a furnace from which the flame bursts forth on all sides."

Almost four hundred years later (1673) when Our Lord for the first time showed His Heart to St. Margaret Mary Alacoque, she recorded the vision in the same manner as Eckart: "From His most Holy Humanity flames issued forth on all sides, especially from His adorable Breast, which resembled a furnace. Opening it He showed me His Divine Heart, the living source of these flames."

Ludolph, the Carthusian, (of Saxony, 1295-1378), one of the most famous mystical writers of the middle ages, began a tradition of devotion to the Wounded Heart among his Carthusian brethren. And here again we can trace Dominican influence for Ludolph had spent three decades of his life before joining the Carthusians as an associate of Eckart, Tauler, and Suso in the Order of Preachers.

Since the sermons of most of these famous medieval Dominican preachers were copied down and frequently reprinted, we can say that they have exercised an even greater apostolate since their death. Even the inner life of St. Peter Canisius, the first German Jesuit, came under its influence.

As for an analysis of the peculiarly Dominican aspect of our devotion, it would be difficult to improve on that given by Father Richstaetter (*loc. cit.* p. 117):

> It is inevitable that in the Dominican Order the devotion to the Heart of Jesus should bear above all the character of Passion-mysticism. While the soul is absorbed in meditation on the sufferings of the Crucified, she is led through the five "Love-tokens," the marks of the Passsion-Wounds, to the Heart wounded with pain and love. By this there develops of itself, through inward prayer, a deep comprehension of the Heart of our Lord; Its love, Its sufferings, Its virtues, and Its mercies.

St. John Eudes and Revival

The next great epoch in the story of the development of devotion to the Most Sacred Heart is the seventeenth century. We might say that Christ was under a cloud during the fifteenth century due to the sins and excesses of the renaissance movement in Europe, and during the sixteenth century because of the bloody attempt of theological revolutionists to tear His Mystical Body into pieces.

With the coming of St. John Eudes (1601-1680), the center for the propagation of devotion to the Sacred Heart shifts from Germany to France, a France which in the seventeenth century was to enjoy a new golden age of Catholic thought and sanctity. St. John Eudes was the originator of priests' retreats, the founder of the Congregation of Jesus and Mary for priests, and the Order of Our Lady of Charity (Good Sheperd sisters). Through his preaching, his congregations of religious, his letters and his books, he greatly spread appreciation and love for the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Immaculate Heart of Mary. But his greatest work in accomplishing this end was the writing and propagation of a mass and office in honor of the Sacred Heart. His liturgical work was approved by many of the bishops of France for their own dioceses. Even in the Visitation Order the feast composed by St. John was in use for half a century before St. Margaret Mary was visited with her great visions. Wherefore Pope Leo XIII in naming Father Eudes a Venerable, called him "the author of the liturgical cult of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary." And when Pope Pius X beatified him in 1909, he proclaimed Eudes "the Father, the Doctor, and the Apostle of this most sweet devotion."

St. Margaret Mary

The scene next shifts to Burgundy to the Visitation Convent of Paray-le-Monial where from 1673 to 1675 a humble nun, St. Margaret Mary Alacoque, received four special apparitions of Our Lord during which were revealed to her the secrets of the Love of the Sacred Heart. She was commissioned to spread devotion to His Heart and to have a feast celebrated in Its honor. To her also were revealed the well-known eleven promises of Our Lord concerning the blessings which He will shower on souls devoted to His Sacred Heart, crowned by the unique twelfth promise, generally called the "great promise", which assures the grace of final penitence to all who receive Holy Communion on the First Friday of nine consecutive months.

St. Margaret Mary is deservedly the best known of all the apostles of the Sacred Heart, for she was especially chosen by Divine Providence to be Its instrument in bringing to fruition the devotion which had been so well begun and so carefully developed by the same loving providence. But, as a cloistered religious, St. Margaret could not herself spread abroad in the church the good tidings which had been entrusted to her. This work she was to accomplish through several priests—friends and counselors—especially the Blessed Claude Columbière, S. J. (1641-1682).

Through Blessed Claude the devotion as taught to St. Margaret Mary became the legacy of the entire Society of Jesus, and the Society has zealously promoted it to our own day.

In the following century, the great preacher, Doctor of the Church and founder of the Redemptorists, St. Alphonsus of Ligouri (1691-1787), realized the importance for the people of this most excellent cult and presented to Pope Clement XIII a Novena to the Adorable Heart of Jesus, in the hope of obtaining papal approval for the liturgical feast. (Although certain bishops had granted approval in their own dioceses, these permissions were, of course, only tentative and dependent on the final approval of the Holy See.) The saint's request was granted by Pope Clement. In the introduction to his novena St. Alphonsus had written:

> This devotion consists wholly in the practice of love for Jesus. This love is the devotion of devotions. It is truly to be lamented that many Christians who perform various exercises of piety neglect this devotion; it is deservedly to be regretted that there are many preachers and confessors who inculcate many practices of piety but never, or almost never, mention this devotion which ought to be the chief one of every Christian. It is due to this neglect that souls make so little progress in virtue, continue to live in the same defects, and even relapse into grievous sins.

Papal Approval

In 1856 Pope Pius IX made the office and mass of the feast of the Sacred Heart obligatory on the universal church, and he approved the idea of the faithful consecrating themselves to the Sacred Heart, composing a special prayer for them to do this. Pope Leo XIII went a step further and personally made a public consecration of the Catholic Church and the whole world to the Heart that so loved men that It shed Its blood to redeem the whole world. The Holy Father also wrote an encyclical letter explaining his action: *Annum Sacrum* (1899).

In the Order of Preachers, Pere Jandel, Master General and reformer of the Order, had taken advantage of Pius IX's permission and consecrated the whole Order to the Sacred Heart in 1872. In 1891 Father (later Cardinal) Fruhwirth, then Master General, followed the example of his model, Pere Jandel, and reconsecrated the Order of Preaching Brothers to the Heart Which they had done so much to honor by word and work from the very earliest age of their existence.

In our own day, Pope Pius XI arranged a new office and mass for the feast of the Sacred Heart and decreed that it should enjoy a privileged octave. Pius XI also wrote two encyclicals concerning our devotion: *Miserentissimus Redemptor* (1928), on the reparation due to the Sacred Heart; and, *Caritate Christi Compulsi* (1932), on the Sacred Heart and world distress.

Theology of the Devotion

If anyone thinks that the Catholic Church permits any devotional practice among her faithful for purely sentimental reasons, it can only be because they are not acquainted with the rigorous theological procedure of investigation demanded by the Church before she will put her stamp of approval on any devotion.

We ought also to point out that although the devotion towards the Sacred Heart, finally approved by the Church, is the same as that taught by St. Margaret Mary, yet the dependence is only an historical one. The reasons why the Church eventually granted recognition to the devotion are theological reasons, and are completely independent of the private revelations given to St. Margaret or to any other saint or mystic. The situation here is the same as in the case of Bl. Juliana of Norwich and the inauguration of the feast of Corpus Christi.

Nature of Adoration

When we speak of a public devotion or cultus approved by the Catholic Church, we mean some kind of worship. When we use the word "worship," we frequently mean adoration in its wide sense, which is nothing other than the honor or reverential respect paid to some dignified person or thing worthy of honor or homage. Thus we say that a husband should worship his wife.

Nevertheless, the term "adoration" is generally considered only in its strict, absolute sense of obeisance owing to God. This most strict sense of adoration of true religion (or latria) is the internal devotion of the mind—an act of the virtue of religion—manifested exteriorly by corporal actions or signs, in which we give honor to God in testimony to His in-finitude and our subjection to Him. Idolatry is the sin of giving this act of adoration of true religion to any being inferior to God and yet not substantially one with Him.

The adoration in its broader sense which we spoke of first of all is called dulia and is the honor due our fellowman because of some special excellence which he possesses, especially if he be our superior. And for those of our fellowmen who are far above the average run of men there is a higher kind of dulia, worship, or reverence called hyperdulia. This is the homage due to the Blessed Virgin Mary, or to the flesh of Christ considered apart from its union with the Word of God.

Except for this possible distinction, (which we should never make in the practical order when performing acts of worship), we would simply say that the human nature of Christ is to be worshipped with adoration of true religion (latria) because of its union with the Divine Word of God. And the same can be said for whatever pertains to the integrity of His human nature—His body and all its parts; however, the Catholic Church never approves the public worship of any part of the Sacred Humanity unless there be a special reason for that worship. Our purpose now is to determine the special reason for encouraging the worship of the Heart of Christ.

Its Object

In discussing the theology of our devotion to the Sacred Heart, we will determine what is the remote object of our worship and what is the proximate or specific object of our worship; in other words, what it has in common with other devotions directed to Our Lord, (e.g. the Precious Blood, the Holy Face, the Five Sacred Wounds), and how it differs from these.

The remote object of these devotions, (also referred to as the whole term or the ultimate term), is the Person of the Divine Word to which the human nature, body, blood, and heart are hypostatically united. In speaking of the hypostatic union, we refer to the supernatural mystery and utterly unique miracle by which two complete but separate natures—one human, one divine,—were inseparably united at the Incarnation in the single person of the Word of God, the Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity. The remote object is obviously the *primary* consideration in these devotions which are directed to particular parts of the Sacred Humanity of Jesus. They are addressed primarily to the Person of the Word Incarnate which assumed Human nautre, because of the excellence of a part or operation of that Sacred Humanity, in which the Person lived and suffered.

The primacy of the remote object is proven to us by the words of Pope Pius VI in his bull *Auctorem Fidei* (1794) in which he condemned the Jansenistic pseudo-council of Pistoia which had declared that this devotion leads to Nestorianism or even to idolatry since its devotees, they claimed, "forget that the most holy flesh of Christ or any part thereof, even His whole humanity, if it is separated or abstracted from the divinity, cannot receive the worship of latria."

To this charge the Pope replied:

> . . . as if the faithful in their adoration of the Heart of Jesus were separating or abstracting it from the divinity, while they are adoring it as the Heart of the Person of the Word (Incarnate) to whom it is inseparably united, just as the lifeless body of Christ, nowise separate or prescinded from the divinty, was adorable during the three days after death that it lay in the sepulchre.

In other words, we worship the Sacred Heart in itself but not for its own sake. All this is in agreement with a principle laid down by St. Thomas:

> . . . properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety; for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And if at any time it happens that we speak of honoring a man's hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored in themselves; but by reason of the whole being honored in them. (*Summa Theol.* III, q. 25, a.l)

The hand is honored, but only insofar as it is a part pertaining to the integrity of the whole person. Sometimes it happens that there is an especially good reason for honoring a part, namely, when it gives a special manifestation of the excellence of the whole. Thus "the beautiful hands of a priest" are especially apt for honor because of the intimate role they play in the sacramental functions which constitute the sublimity of the priestly state. This brings us to the question of the manifestative term of our worship of the Sacred Heart (also called the partial object or, as we said before, the proximate object) which specifies this devotion from all others.

Possible Meanings

We have the solution to our question when we mention the "heart." But there are several ways in which we could understand the word "heart." So we must consider which of these possibilities is the correct one.

The first possibility is that we refer only to the physical heart of Christ. This is no longer held because of the words of Pius VI, already quoted, which determine at least that we cannot separate the physical heart from its remote object, the person of the Word Incarnate.

The second possibility is the other extreme, viz., that our worship is referred to the heart of Christ only insofar as it is a symbol, i.e., only to a metaphorical heart without His physical heart being part of the object. The Jansenists who had always vigorously opposed devotion to the Sacred Heart, pretending to believe that the Catholic Church did not approve of it, shifted to this second opinion when Clement XIII approved the devotion in 1765. But Clement had given his approbation to the cultus "as it is already established." And the whole history of the devotion is contrary to this opinion which excludes the physical heart from the object of our worship. Thus the memorial of the Polish bishops and the King of Poland petitioning for the approbation had stated: "There is no *sensible and corporal* object in the whole world that could be with greater reason proposed to the worship of the faithful than this Sacred Heart, so loving and so afflicted." And it was to this request of 1728 that Pope Clement was acceding in 1765 in approving the devotion, for he specifically stated that he was setting aside the previous decision which had refused their request; and certainly the bull, *Auctorem Fidei,* issued by Pius VI in 1794 quoted above should have laid to rest this second opinion for all time. (But it did not. The theory cropped out again in the 19th century.) For Pius VI had not denied the Jansenists' allegation that the faithful adore the physical Heart of Christ; he merely maintains that they are right in doing so in the way approved by the Church.

True Meaning

The third and last opinion is the correct one. It is a synthesis of opinions one and two, and it states that the specifying object of our worship is the physical heart of Christ as a symbol of His love for men. The following arguments can be brought forth in proof of this conclusion: 1) It is the common opinion of theologians today. 2) When the Jansenist bishop, Scipio de' Ricci, attempted in 1781 to reopen the controversy concerning the liceity of the devotion, Pope Pius VI answered him in these words:

> This Holy See has . . . sufficiently declared the substance of that devotion . . . consists in this, that we contemplate and venerate the immense Charity and effusive Love of Our Divine Redeemer under the symbolic image of the Heart.

3) Pope Leo XIII in approving a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites raising the feast of the Sacred Heart to the rank of a greater double of the first class (June 28th, 1899) had this to say:

> . . . and the outstanding benefits of the Charity of Our Redeemer under the symbol of His Most Sacred Heart . . .

4.) The same Holy Father in his encyclical letter, *Annum Sacrum:*

> And since we have in the Sacred Heart a symbol and a sensible image of the Infinite Love of Jesus Christ which moves us etc. . .

5.) Clement XIII and the approved lessons and hymns of the liturgy all speak in the same tenor.

Here we have two elements in our specifying or proximate object, a material element and a spiritual element. But these two elements make a single object for our act of worship: the physical heart of Christ, not just as it is a physical organ—a pump of blood—but precisely as it is a symbol of the Love of Jesus. But if we examine in themselves these two elements, we must conclude that the Love of the Word which is symbolized holds a primacy over the Heart which symbolizes it.

But the Sacred Heart as symbolical of Love, is also symbolical of the whole affective life of Our Lord. As St. Thomas puts it:

> Love is the principle of every affection: for joy and desire are concerned about a good that is loved; fear and sadness are about evil which is contrary to the good that is loved; and from these all the other affections have their origin. (C. G. I., 91.)

Assuming that the affections of the sensitive nature are closely united to the movements of the higher affections; and assuming that the former since they participate in the morality of the latter, can be included in the symbolism; it is a legitimate inference that the Sacred Heart of Our Lord, in symbolizing His Love, symbolizes also His whole affective life, and implicity includes elements pertaining to His moral and intellectual life.

Symbol of Divine Love

But though it is sufficiently demonstrated that the Heart of flesh of Jesus, as a symbol of His Love for us, is the proximate or specifying object of our worship, our problems are not yet over. "Symbol of His Love," we say; but which love? The created human love of His human will or the uncreated divine Love of His divine will? Some theologians of our day still hold for the first choice (e.g. Hugon, O.P. and Vermeersch, S.J.), but we follow Cardinal Billot and Pére Bainvel, S.J., in maintaining that the symbolism primarily regards the subsistent Divine Love. There are very good arguments at hand from papal documents: 1) Pope Leo XIII in the encyclical quoted above spoke of the Sacred Heart as the symbol of the Infinite Love of Jesus Christ; 2) Pius XI in *Miserentissimus Redemptor* spoke of the same Love:

> . . . the act of consecration by which we offer . . . to the Heart of Jesus, . . . all. . . recognizing that all we have comes to us from the Infinite Charity of God.

Now we could say that the love of the human will of Christ is infinite in its own order because it follows on His grace which is infinite in its own order. We could not say that the love of His human will is infinite *simpliciter* but only that that of His Divine Will, which follows on subsistent grace, is infinite *simpliciter* (i.e. absolutely or without qualification). 3) Likewise the decree for the institution of the feast (1765) and the hymn for Vespers speak of the Charity which urged the Only-Begotten Son of God to take on human nature which, of course, could only be the Infinite Divine Love.

Concluding Explanation

It might be objected that the Uncreated Love pertains to the whole Trinity; and hence the devotion to the Sacred Heart is not a special cult of Christ alone, but of the whole Trinity.

Granting that the Uncreated Love is common to the whole Trinity, we would reply that it nevertheless has a special manifestation in Christ. For the entire Trinity united human nature to the Person of the Word;

but only the Word assumed human nature, not the other two Persons. And finally, the Second Person subsisting in human nature, His human will perfectly subjected to the Divine Will, willed to suffer for us.

We must add that, secondarily, the human love of Christ is also symbolized by His Heart, for His Heart is certainly united to His human soul, and His human will (just as His whole humanity) is an instrument used in the exercise of His Divine Love and therefore participates in that Love.

In summation, we conclude that in the devotion to the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus we primarily worship the Person of the Word Incarnate to which this Heart is hypostatically united. The particular reason for worshiping the Heart is because of the Divine Love of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity for us, which is fittingly manifested and symbolized by His living Heart of flesh.

James Griffin Whalen, O.P.

LEARNING HUMANLY

CURIOSITY does not kill cats. It never has. The truth of the matter is that cats are incapable of being curious. Curiosity is a vice; and vices and virtues are peculiar to men. But we can learn something about vices and virtues from watching cats. Saint Thomas sometimes uses them as examples. To illustrate the need for virtues, he uses a lion. Animals can follow their natural inclinations; but man is a creature endowed with reason. The natural inclinations of man are tempered and directed by reason. Saint Thomas puts it this way:

> . . . a natural disposition which inclines to one virtue, inclines to the contrary of another virtue; for example, one who is naturally inclined to fortitude, which is exercised in the achievement of difficult things, is less disposed to meekness, which consists in refraining the passions of the irascible [appetite]; hence we see that animals naturally inclined to the act of some virtue are inclined to a vice contrary to another virtue; as the lion, who is naturally daring is also naturally cruel. This natural inclination to one or another virtue is sufficient for animals that are unable to reach a perfect good according to virtue, but seek determined goods; but men are able to reach a perfect good according to virtue, and hence they should have an inclination to all acts of the virtues. Since this cannot be from nature, it must be according to reason, in which are the seeds of all the virtues.[1]

A virtue is a good habit; it gives to a natural inclination some of the perfection of reason. A virtuous man acts reasonably in the same easy manner that the cat is inquisitive or the lion daring. Saint Thomas does not extoll the "noble savage"; the "natural man" is not enough. The *man* who tends to be brave cannot be caloused and unmindful of mercy; that would be less than human. Man needs virtues because he is a reasonable being and is expected to act like one. The lion does not need virtues. He is not a reasonable being; we do not condemn him if his daring is not tempered with mercy.

Studiousness is only one of the virtues; it might even be called a small virtue, if there were such a thing as a small virtue. It does not concern only the half-starved individual in horn-rimmed glasses; the one who, like Milton's scholar, is "deep versed in books and shallow in himself." Nothing could be further from the truth. Studiousness is a virtue which all men need, for few men are naturally disposed to it. Curiosity is opposed to it. The cat, naturally unable to mind its own business, is the traditional example of the curious. But curiosity has had a more telling effect on men than upon cats. Much modern advertising is based on it. Advertisers rely on human curiosity when they put their signs in strange out-of-the-way places, where people will break their necks trying to read them. Merchants conjur up outlandish and mysterious slogans to woo the human mind to consider their product. So a clearer view of this virtue is called for.

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[1] *Quaestiones Disputatae, "Quaestio Unica de Virtutibus in Communi,"* a. 8, ad 10um, (Ed. 7a Taurinensis).

Nominal Definition

It is good to start with the name. The word *studiousness* occupies a minor spot in Webster. It is one of those variations which follow a word worthy of definition; it follows the word *studious.* Ultimately it is reduced to the word *study.* There are many uses for the word, but they all have something in common: they concern the diligent and attentive acquisition of knowledge. The Latin word *studium* adds another note, that of zeal. Thus the name *studiousness* implies zeal, diligence, and attention in the pursuit of knowledge.

The man in the street looks at it in much the same way. He considers the student to be one who diligently applies himself to learning. If the student is respected, a note of value is added; the knowledge which he seeks is really useful, be it speculative or practical. The "walking encyclopedia" is not commonly regarded as a student.

For Saint Thomas, the word *study* implied the "vehement application of the mind to something."[2] Since the only way that the mind is applied to anything is by knowing it, he said that study was concerned first with knowledge, then with anything which is done under the direction of knowledge. Aristotle used the word for the practical study of virtue; the studious man was the virtuous man. This comes under the second meaning given by Saint Thomas; in all his actions man is directed by reason.

There can be little doubt as to the meaning of the name. Study is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge. Our nominal definition: studiousness is that by which men zealously apply themselves to the acquisition of useful knowledge.

The Need for This Virtue

Is there a real need for such a virtue? Is man's *desire* for knowledge always reasonable? Or is it capable of disorder? Looking at man as he usually acts, there are two ways in which the quest for knowledge can be unreasonable. The first is accidental, as in the case of a man who seeks the knowledge of truth only to feel superior to other men. His purpose is not truth, but pride. The same always holds true when man makes his knowledge of truth serve sinful ends. But the very desire for knowledge can also be unreasonable. There are numerous examples. Saint Thomas gives four.[3] The first is neglect of necessary study for less useful study. Many students shrink from real intellectual labor to spend their time in wholly useless occupations. Others take "snap" courses for no other reason than that they are easy. But this does not concern students alone.

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[2] *Summa Theologica,* (Faucher), IIa IIae, Q. 166, a. 1.
[3] *ibid,* Q. 167, a. 1.

There are examples in everyday life. For instance, a man might spend hours reading the daily papers and never get around to learning basic traffic regulations. Many an automobile accident has resulted from a driver trying to read a new billboard instead of paying attention to his driving.

The second example of an unreasonable desire for knowledge which Saint Thomas gives is that of learning from the wrong sources. He mentions demons; it might also include fortune tellers or condemned books. This has application for Catholic students who endanger their faith in secular universities.

The third way is when the knowledge of creatures is not referred to the proper end. The knowledge of creatures is good and necessary; but ultimately it should lead to a fuller knowledge of God.

Finally, there are limits to a man's ability. It is useless for a man to attempt to go beyond these limits; at times it is worse than useless. It always defeats its own purpose, for its end is ignorance, not science. This also applies to the limitations of particular sciences. A man can be an excellent biologist; but that does not entitle him to make solemn and definitive statements on theological matters. The scientist may be expected to know the limitations of his own field. In spite of the impression one gets from the daily papers, theology is not a field occupied only by amateurs. This does not mean that the amateur cannot have opinions; only that they should be advanced as such. The weight that a man has in one field should not be thrown about lightly in others. It is seldom that a geologist will step out of his field and fight with a biologist about biology. Theology and politics, however, always seem to be wide open; playgrounds for interloping experts.

These examples should suffice to demonstrate that man is capable of curiosity; of misusing his natural desire to know. Hence there is a need for a virtue.

Real Definition

But what is the nature of the virtue which will control this desire? What is it that makes a man studious? To answer this it is necessary to determine the objects. In other words, what is studiousness concerned with, and why?

The remote matter of this virtue is had from the nominal definition. Studiousness concerns knowledge. But the question arises, what knowledge? Merely intellectual? Sense knowledge? Or both? Saint Thomas says both. This is shown from an examination of the contrary vice. It is clear from what has been said about the need for the virtue that man is curious about intellectual knowledge. It also involves sense knowledge, as an examination of sense knowledge reveals. Such knowledge has a double purpose. First, it is ordered to the knowledge of corporal goods necessary for bodily life, ". . . because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid that which is harmful to them, and seek those things which are necessary for the sustinence of the body."[4] Secondly, sense knowledge in man has a special order to intellectual knowledge. In the first sense it can be unreasonable when it is ordered to evil. The inquiry into the actions of others may be ordered to detraction. The smell of strong drink may lead some to drunkenness. In the second instance, the ordination of sense knowledge to the intellectual must be recalled. There is a unity, an order which must be served. A man can waste time by being too much attached to sense knowledge. A full, rich variety of sense knowledge contributes to the perfection of knowledge; but it can and should terminate in a fuller and richer intellectual grasp of reality. Give each its due; but the lower must serve the higher.

The proximate matter of this virtue is more determined. It is that precise aspect of knowledge which involves the virtue of studiousness. Just how does studiousness apply to man's quest for knowledge? Saint Thomas answers thus:

> . . . studiousness is not directly about knowledge itself, but about the desire and zeal in the pursuit of knowledge. We must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and zeal in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing truth . . . or because one uses knowledge of truth in order to sin.
>
> On the other hand, the *desire* or *zeal* for truth may be right or wrong.[5]

The precise point is the desire or zeal for study. This desire must be moderated; and this is the reason for the virtue. To live according to reason involves the subjection of this *desire for truth* to the dictates of reason. Hence Saint Thomas says:

> . . . the good of man consists in the knowledge of the true; but the greatest good of man does not consist in the knowledge of any truth whatsoever, but in the perfect knowledge of the highest truth, as is obvious from the Philosopher in the tenth book of the Ethics, chapters seven and eight. Thus there can be evil in the knowledge of certain truths, according as the appetite [for truth] is not ordered in the proper manner to the knowledge of the highest truth, in which consists the highest happiness.[6]

In fine, the motive of this virtue is to obtain knowledge always according to right reason. Ultimately, this means that our study should lead us to a knowledge of God. The desire to know many things must be moderated in order that we may know the few things which are necessary.

At this point a definition of the virtue is possible. Studiousness is a virtue moderating man's desire for knowledge. Or it is a virtue disposing man to acquire knowledge according to right reason. A more down-to-earth way to put it is this: studiousness is that virtue which makes a man mind his own business.

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[4] IIa IIae, Q. 167, a. 2.

[5] *Ibid,* Q. 167, a. 1.

[6] *Ibid.* Q. 167, a.1 ad 1 um.

The Subject of the Virtue

The next point for consideration is the subject of the virtue. Just as every act of man proceeds from some faculty, which is the subject of the act, so every virtue has a subject which it determines to a more perfect act.

> The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or of an act cannot be other than the object of the power which is the subject of both.[7]

The proper object, or the proximate matter of the virtue of studiousness is the desire for knowledge. Now the subject will be found by investigating this object and considering the powers of man which are ordered to it. There are four possibilities: the intellect, the will, the irascible appetite and the concupiscible appetite. The intellect is excluded immediately, for knowledge is assumed here as something *desirable;* a good. The subject of the virtue will be part of man's appetitive make-up. It is a desire which is to be perfected. Since the most proper work of the virtue is the moderation of the desire, the irascible appetite is also excluded. The removing of impediments to study is secondary and in a way accidental to this virtue. The concupiscible appetite is excluded because the object of the virtue is not merely the desire for sense knowledge, but also, indeed most properly, intellectual knowledge. For it is intellectual knowledge which is most proper to man; sense knowledge serves intellectual knowledge. It is here that the need for this virtue is greatest. The only remaining possibility is the will.

Some Difficulties

But here a number of objections arise. Saint Thomas indicates that the will has a limited need for virtue. The object of the will is good; knowledge is a good in itself. It seems that the will would have no need of a virtue to regulate the desire for knowledge. Any good which is proportioned to the will is sought easily, without a virtue to guide its action. But experience shows that the desired good is not always sought reasonably. In his treatment of the virtues in general, Saint Thomas says that a thing can be out of proportion to the will in two ways. First, there is a good which exceeds goods which men can attain with his native powers; this includes supernatural goods, such as grace and contrition for sin, and increase in the love of God. These can be attained only through the supernatural virtue of charity. The second way in which a good escapes being proportioned to the will occurs when it is not for oneself, but for another. The will seeks the good of the individual naturally and easily; here no virtue is required. But it does not seek the good of another naturally and easily. A man needs a virtue in order to be generous, i.e., to give to worthy persons out of his own abundance, without any motive of personal aggrandizment. The virtue that will perfect him in this action is liberality. If the only virtue needed in the will is justice, there is no room for studiousness.

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[7] *Ibid.* 162, 3.

Solution of Difficulties

To solve the difficulty, it is necessary to re-examine the motive, the moderation of the desire for knowledge. Is this a good which exceeds the native ability of the will to attain? Evidently it is; but why?

Here it is well to recall that the intellect is, simply speaking, prior to the will. On this point a modern Thomist has written:

> The good is only an object of the will in as far as it is known—*bonum apprehensum.* And it is known and presented to the will by the intellect. Consequently, the intellect gives the will its object, which as actual, it reduces from potency to act.[8]

The intellect will always present truth as a good, since it is a good in itself. No virtue is required for the will to accept this as good. But in the notion of a moderated appetite for truth there must also be the notion of relative values. Each particular object will be presented as something which is good to know. But among these particular objects there must be an order; some are more necessary than others. And this does exceed the native power of the will. It is precisely here that a virtue is needed. John of Saint Thomas, commenting on the *Summa,* has this to say:

> . . . the virtue of studiousness, which is opposed to this vice [of curiosity], is not required for the inclination to truth in general . . . but in the application of this or that determined truth, in as far as the necessary order to the highest truth is present or lacking.[9]

In other words, the moderation of the desire for truth *according to right reason* demands that particular objects of knowledge be sought in their proper place. They are to be sought as they fit into the real needs of the individual; and the end of man must include an order to the highest and first truth. If this order is absent, life according to reason is impossible. And it is this order which exceeds the native power of the will. Where an object exceeds the native power of the will, where it is not connatural to it, there it is possible and necessary to have a virtue subjected in the will, even when the good is the good of the individual.

Presuppositions

What does this virtue presuppose? Knowledge is a good which is desired by men. But everything which man does must be ordered to his last end. Hence man's desire for knowledge must be ordered to his last end. But this alone is not enough. The means to the end must also be considered. This is something practical; the work of prudence. Into its determination will enter one's state in life; his consequent obligations; his natural abilities; in short, all the equipment (natural and supernatural) by which a man is to reach his end, inasmuch as he needs knowledge to direct him.

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[8] P. Gallus M. Manser, O.P., *Das Wesen des Thomismus* (Freiburg, Schweiz, 1949).

[9] Joannes a Sancto Thoma. *Cursus Theologicus* (Matriti, 1645) t. 2, pag. 163.

Acts of the Virtue

The primary act of studiousness is the moderation of the desire for knowledge. It amounts to minding one's own business. This act has already been discussed in connection with the need for the virtue and the objects.

There is a secondary act; that of removing impediments to the reasonable acquisition of knowledge. This includes the overcoming of inertia, difficulties encountered in the matter to be studied, and similar obstacles. But this is secondary, and according to Saint Thomas, accidental.[10] It is exercised in common with other virtues, such as perseverance.

Classification of the Virtue

It remains to discuss the place of studiousness among the virtues. It is a distinct virtue, having a proper object. It is not then a subjective or an integral part of any of the cardinal virtues. It must be placed as a potential part. A virtue is a potential part of one of the cardinal virtues in so far as it participates in the power and the nature of that virtue. Its act must be similar. The act of studiousness is one of moderation; restraining the desire for knowledge. Hence studiousness is a potential part of temperance, for temperance moderates the desire for pleasure in matters of touch. In this moderation the two are similar. In his division of the potential parts of temperance Saint Thomas says:

> It is clear to all that the restraint of the pleasures of touch has a special difficulty. Hence all distinguished temperance from modesty.
>
> But in addition to this Tullius *(lib. 2 de Invent. aliquant. ante fin.)* considered that there was a special good in the moderation of punishments: therefore he also separated clemency from modesty, placing modesty in those other things which need moderation. These seem to be four: the first is the motion of the soul toward some excellence, which *humility* moderates. The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge; and studiousness which is opposed to curiosity moderates this.[11]

So, where temperance moderates the pleasures of the sense of touch, which is especially difficult, studiousness moderates the desire for knowledge. In this moderation of the appetite for a good it participates in the mode of temperance. It is a potential part of temperance.

To attempt too complete an analysis here would mean a most horrible defeat; it would be acting contrary to the virtue under consideration, a lapse into curiosity. And it is written: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability: but the things that God hath commanded thee, think on them always, and in many of his works be not curious."[12]

John Francis Jacobs, O.P.
Jordan Bishop, O.P.

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[10] IIa IIae, Q. 166, a. 2, ad 3.
[11] *Ibid.*, Q. 160, a. 2.
[12] *Ecclesiasticus*, 3:22.

THE AGING UNIVERSE

GOD CREATED man in His image and likeness. But it did not take long for man to reciprocate by making to his liking gods in his own image. The history of the human race from Adam down to our own days is befouled with the innumerable idols that man has fashioned to satisfy his essential needs; for, as a contingent and transient being, his very nature cries out for a necessary and permanent Being to give stability and meaning to his life. Having rejected the one and only God, man's sole alternative to madness was to transfer the attributes of God to creatures. In recent centuries one of the principal recipients of the attribution of the divine qualities has been the physical universe; to it were given an infinite extension in imitation of God's ubiquity, and, similarly, an existence without beginning or end as a counterfeit of His eternity. A satisfactory substitute for God's infinite power was found in the vast energies stored in the almost unlimited number of stars. Thus, gratuitously endowed with the marks of the Deity, the created cosmos could serve as man's security against the constant storms which rage in his violated spirit.

However, many thoughtful men of today are not totally unaware of this chaotic condition and its gravity, as is well borne out by a few remarks found in a recent work of Prof. C. F. von Weizsäcker.[1] In his discussion of the relationship between nature and man he states:

> But for all modern men, nature has been the setting in which alone human life was secure. Therefore, nature had to be immutably real and without limits, else she would not have offered firm support to the subject who is endlessly reaching out beyond himself.
>
> The idea of an infinite nature existing as such, this idea that we have to give up, is the myth of modern science. Science started out by destroying the myth of the Middle Ages. And now science is is forced by its own consistency to realize that it has merely raised another myth instead. If man lets go of this myth too, what is left to him?[2]

Although these remarks have indicated a rather extensive field of study, the object of the present discussion is to examine briefly the principal facts and hypotheses which underlie much of the current cosmological theories, and to indicate in the barest terms a few of the philosophical and theological implications of such thought. No attempt or claim is made that this is to be an exhaustive survey of the field; it is merely a quick glance at those items which seem to hold a central position in the writings of some who are interested in the subject.

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[1] *The History of Nature,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 69.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 71-2.

Finite Universe

Scientists now generally agree that the universe is finite in spatial extent and in duration. The arguments in favor of these conclusions are only probable, and it is doubtful whether unaided reason can ever attain to a greater certainty in this matter. Saint Thomas Aquinas, the perfecter of Aristotle, explicitly wrote that the creation of the universe in time is credible but not demonstrable; that is, human reason without the aid of revelation cannot disprove the existence of the universe from eternity.[3]

The age of the earth is now estimated to be about three to four billion years,[4] while the age of the entire cosmos is placed at only four to five billion years.[5] This latter figure is a fairly recent determination, for just some twenty years ago, Sir James Jeans wrote in his *Astronomy and Cosmogony* that the present universe must have existed for about ten thousand billion years.[6] This change in the estimated age of the universe is of some importance, not so much in the amount but in the direction of the change, i.e., to a smaller figure. A few years ago, Lecomte du Noüy in one of his books presented some calculations of Prof. Charles-Eugene Guye based on the finitude of the universe and the mathematical laws of probability proving that life could not have appeared on earth, nor anywhere else in the universe, purely by chance.[7] The universe was very much smaller and younger than the size and time which would have been required by the laws of chance for the production of the tiniest bit of living protoplasm. Hence, in the eyes of those for whom such a bit of mathematical reasoning has more appeal than the more certain but philosophical demonstrations, this particular proof from the laws of probability is strengthened by the revised age of the universe.

The reasons underlying the new figure are quite interesting, and at the same time reveal something of the scientist's approach to such a problem. There are four converging lines of argument used to arrive at the quantitative solution now generally accepted. These proceed from an analysis of: 1) radioactive minerals found in terrestrial rocks and in meteorites, 2) the characteristic "red-shift" in the spectrum of extra-galactic nebulae, 3) the development of stars, and 4) the stability of rotating stars.[8]

Radioactive Minerals

Analysis of radioactive minerals has been aided by the research programs conducted shortly before and during the war, for they have increased our knowledge of radioactive disintegration with a consequent improvement in the accuracy of such measurements. The basic principle is that no known conditions, with the exceptions of those existing in stellar interiors, can alter the *rate* at which radioactive substance release their energy. For example, one of the radioactive isotopes of Radium, Radium D, disintegrates at such a rate that in twenty-two years only one-half of the original amount remains as such, and in the following twenty-two years one-half of the remainder, or one-fourth of the starting quantity is left, and so on indefinitely. This figure, twenty-two years, is known as the half-life of Radium D; and for the various elements, and for isotopes of the same element, the half-life may vary from a fraction of a second to billions of years.

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[3] *Summa Theologica,* I, q. 46, a. 2.

[4] Weizsacker, *op. cit.,* p. 28.

[5] H. Margenau, "Marginalia," *American Scientist,* 37:422, July, 1949.

[6] (2nd ed., Cambridge: The University Press, 1929), pp. 139, 381, 417.

[7] *Human Destiny* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), chap. III.

[8] Weizsacker, *op. cit.,* chaps. III and IV.

The important thing to be noted with regard to radioactive disintegration is that the *ultimate* product is a stable element, even though it may pass through more or less numerous intermediate stages which are unstable. In certain cases it is know that a particular stable element found in conjunction with a particular radioactive element in minerals of certain specified structures can only have been the end-result of such a sequence. Hence, by comparing the amount of the stable element present together with the amount of the parent radioactive substance associated with it, one can calculate the length of time required for the attainment of that proportion, assuming that at the beginning none of the stable element in question was present. From such data an approximate age can be assigned to the world, for it is obvious that the atoms comprising the minerals of the earth must have existed before the earth entered upon its present state. Many different radioactive minerals from widely separated places have been used in these determinations, and all values thus obtained have been in fairly close agreement. A similar analysis of meteorites has yielded a maximum figure about twice the age of the earth as obtained by the above method.

Shift to the Red

The second line of reasoning proceeds from the astronomical observation that the spectrum of the light from extra-galactic nebulae (i.e., tremendous clouds of stars or star material which are outside of our own galactic system—the Milky Way) is shifted towards the longer wave lengths, i.e., the red. This observation is usually interpreted to be analogous to the Doppler effect of sound, a phenomenon familiar to most of us in this age of high speeds. For example, the apparent pitch of the horn on a Diesel locomotive as it rapidly approaches, appears to rise a note or two, but the reverse happens after the train has passed and is rapidly moving away. In this example, the first shift of the "sound spectrum" of the Diesel's horn is toward the higher frequency and the *shorter* wave length; the second shift, however, as the train is moving away from the observer, is toward the longer wave length which is heard as an apparent lowering of the pitch. Applying this principle to light, astrophysicists conclude that this shift to the red in the spectrum of these distant nebulae indicate that they are *moving away* from the earth at a very high velocity. It is further observed that this rate of recession increases as the nebulae are more distant from us. From these considerations Prof. Hubble, who made the initial discoveries in this matter, Canon Lemaitre of Belgium, and others have suggested that the universe is expanding,[9] that at sometime in the past an explosion occured which sent all consitutent matter flying in every direction from a common center. By calculating back from the known data it is possible to arrive at an approximate date for this event which many consider as the "birth" of the universe as we know it; about two billion years ago is the calculated figure.[10] But, on the basis of other facts, this value must be increased to about five or six billion years.

Stellar Energy

The third approach uses as its basis a study of the various types of stars and star systems. It is known that the principal sources, if not the only sources of solar and stellar radiant energy—light and heat, are the nuclear reactions taking place within the star. These energy-giving reactions consist in the formation of helium atoms from hydrogen atoms (through a complex series of steps), as a result of which a fraction of the mass is converted into energy.[11] The latest addition to atomic warfare is essentially this reaction, utilizing the tremendous heat of the "old-fashioned" uranium fission as a sort of fuse or primer.[12] Ten million tons of matter *per second* are lost by our sun in this manner, and yet this prodigality can be continued for another fifty billion years. Some of the brighter stars are losing matter at a rate three hundred times greater than that of the sun, suggesting the conclusion, in conjunction with other facts, that the present stars, on the average, could not have been in operation for much more than a few billion years in the past.

Rotating Stars and Nebulae

The fourth argument for the finite origin in time of the universe as it is now constituted is derived from a study of the stability of rotating stars and nebulae. The dynamics of this is too complicated to enter into here, but it is mentioned in order to make manifest the point that the astrophysicist has used as many different viewpoints as possible in the investigation of this problem, insuring by this means a degree of probability commensurate with the agreement of the various answers among themselves. But, though none of the preceeding facts and theories taken individually are in any way near to being a convincing argument for the conclusion that the age of the universe is about five billion years, yet taken together their approximate agreement within the latitude of observational error is, at least, very suggestive that the truth is not very far off. It should be noted, too, that the actual determinations are, of course, more complicated, painstaking, and thorough that what has been presented here.

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[9] Sir W. C. Dampier, *History of Science* (3rd ed., New York: Macmillan & Co., 1942), pp. 444, 515.

[10] Weizsacker, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[11] Robert E. Marshak, "The Energy of the Stars," *Scientific American*, vol. 182, No. 1, pp. 42-45, January, 1950.

[12] L. N. Ridenour, "The Hydrogen Bomb," *Scientific American*, vol. 182, No. 3, pp. 11-15, March, 1950.

Life-expectancy of the Universe

But what about the life-expectancy of the universe? Is it finite or infinite, i.e., will it last for eternity. The general opinion among scientists is that the universe will meet its end in the form of the so-called "heat death". This is not to be understood in the sense of a universal conflagration, but something of an almost opposite nature; a condition where all, or most, of the matter will have been converted into energy, and the energy itself will be existing in an unavailable form: a heat energy uniformly distributed throughout the entire vast expanse of a motionless and lifeless space. According to the calculation of Sir James Jeans made in 1928, "the main mass of matter now in existence will have been transformed into radiation"[13] in some one thousand billion years, assuming that the present rate for the conversion of mass into energy is maintained.

How Big Is It?

Not only is the universe finite both in past time and future time, but also in spatial extent, although Sir Arthur Eddington describes this limitation in rather strange terms: "Although the volume of space is finite, there is no boundary; nor any center of spherical space. Every point stands in the same relation to the rest of space as every other point."[14] This peculiar concept certainly defies any attempt of the imagination to form a picture of it, and one reason for this is that its strange structure is derived, at least in part, from the theories of Relativity which are the product of mathematical reasoning. In any event, the important thing is that space, that is, the universe, is considered as being finite, limited in volume, mass, and radius.

According to the latest figures,[15] the radius of the universe is some 10^{22} miles (i.e., one followed by twenty-two zeros); but this space is not considered to be Eucledian but Riemannian. Eucledian space is physical space as ordinarily understood; it is space in which the geometry of Euclid is valid—hence the name. On the other hand, Riemannian space refers to physical space as being of such a nature that its geometric properties are those contained in the geometry of Riemann. That there are no parallel lines and no infinite lines (for all straight lines are closed, i.e., return upon themselves) are two characteristics of this non-Eucledian geometry. The General Theory of Einstein which embodies Riemannian geometry, proposes a universe so constituted that matter in space produces a "warp" or "curvature," not merely in the three spatial dimensions—length, width, and height—but in a continuum composed of these three plus time considered as a fourth dimension. The total effect, so it appears, is to produce a finite and closed universe.[16] But here again the precise meaning is not too important for our present study, for it suffices to observe that some definite value is given to a finite radius.

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[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 421.

[14] *The Mathematical Theory of Relativity*, (2nd Ed., Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 156.

[15] Margenau, *op. cit.*, p. 423.

[16] R. Courant and H. Robbins, *What is Mathematics?*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 224-27.

An appreciation of the tremendous distance involved in the astronomical structure of the universe can be had from the following scale model proposed by Sir James Jeans.[17] Let the dot of an "i" in ordinary type represent the earth's orbit, remembering that its radius is about ninety-three million miles; the earth would then be a very tiny speck about one-millionth of an inch in diameter. The nearest star to the earth, Proxima Centauri, which is some twenty-five million million (25 thousand billion) miles distant, would be about seventy-five yards from the dot marking the earth's orbit. And *in the same scale* the farthest nebulae photographed with the new two hundred-inch Hale telescope on Palomar mountain would be about ten million miles,[18] representing one thousand million (one billion) *light-years* of distance. (One light-year is the distance that light travels in one year at the speed of 186,000 miles a second, which is about 5.9 million million miles). With these comparisons, one can have some comprehension of the statement that the estimated radius of the universe is about two to three thousand million *light-years.* But yet, it must be realized that it is not the radius of an *ordinary* sphere which is here described, but that of our universe which in all probability has no resemblance to anything in our experience.

Notwithstanding that the distances of the various planets, stars, and nebulae are obtained by rather straightforward calculations, it is entirely another matter to determine the outer limits of our universe, for obviously there are no boundary markers or surveyor's posts indicating that one has reached the end, beyond which no voyage is possible, either in fact or in thought. Nevertheless, a numerical value is assigned to a finite radius, but only as a tentative estimation in view of the indirect procedure involved in such a computation.

Star-dotted Sky

It is a common fact,[19] but one from which most of us have never drawn any particular conclusions, that the night sky is *dotted* with stars rather than presenting to the eyes a *sheet* of light, for if the universe were *infinite in size* and included an *infinite number* of stars distributed in the manner in which the known stars are spread in the telescopic sky, the eye would not see *points* of light but a *continuous luminosity.* Hence, since the fact of observation is to the contrary, it means, either that space is *infinite* and contains only a *finite* number of stars in a *finite* portion of it, or that space is *finite* and that all of it contains stars. Independent considerations stemming from the theory of Relativity place more weight in the second alternative. Therefore space is finite in volume.

But how is even an approximate value arrived at? The two principal arguments flow convergently from the Special and General Theories of Relativity. It was stated above that: 1) the spectra of distant nebulae show a shift to the red suggesting that these objects are moving away from us at a very high velocity, and 2) these velocities are directly proportional to the distances of the nebulae from us. This observation added to the requirement of the Special Theory that *no body* (i.e., anything corporeal, material) can have a velocity greater than that of light, leads the physicist to the conclusion that the farthest nebulae would be those possessing the largest velocity possible, i.e., that of light. Then, by dividing the velocity of light by a number known as the recession constant, which is a quantitative approximation of Hubble's law, the radius of the observable universe is obtained.[20] It is *assumed,* of course, that the end of the universe corresponds to the positions of the farthest theoretically visible nebulae, for *if* any could travel as fast or faster than the speed of light, these would not be visible to us because their light would never reach us since their forward velocity would cancel out the backward velocity of a beam of light directed toward an observer on earth. The estimate obtained by this procedure is in fair agreement with that derived from the General Theory.[21]

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[17] *Op. cit.,* p. 5.

[18] E. P. Hubble, "Five Historic Photographs from Palomar," *Scientific American,* vol. 181, No. 5, p. 38, November, 1949.

[19] Margenau, *op. cit.,* p. 422.

Constant Creation of Matter

Up to this point attention has been focused principally on the majority opinion. Recently, however, there has been a growing awareness that certain of the observational data do not fit very well into the current cosmological theories. Consequently, several physicists have suggested an alernate hypothesis that *new* matter is being continuously created. Prof. Margenau in reviewing some "daring cosmological conjectures"[22] of the new hypothesis proposed by Pascal Jordan, states that ". . . . we must face the conclusion that *particles are being continually generated;* the act of creation occurs throughout the heavens today. Novae are stars vigorously signalling their birth."[23] To give this theory a tangible rendering, Prof. Margenau neatly presents the new picture in the following terms:

> In more concrete terms, Jordan's hypotheses envisages a universe created about 4 x 10^9 [four billion] years ago. At the age of 10^{-23} seconds, it had a radius of 10^{-13} [one-ten thousand billionth] cm and contained a single pair of elementary particles, probably neutrons. Their mass-energy was exactly compensated by the gravitational potential energy between these particles, gravitation being a powerful force at that time. The embryonic universe grew and acquired mass. When it was 10 seconds old it had a radius of about 1000 miles and contained 10^{49} elementary particles, a mass smaller that that of our moon. There were present 10^9 [one billion] miniature fixed stars, each weighing about a million tons. The size of a star born at that time was 1 millimeter. Spiral nebulae were absent at this early stage. Since then, our universe has clearly come a long way.[24]

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[20] W. H. McCrea, "The Steady-state Theory of the Expanding Universe," *Endeavor,* 9:7, January, 1950.

[21] Weizsacker, *op. cit.,* p. 41.

[22] *Op. cit.,* p. 422.

[23] *Loc. cit.*

[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 424-5.

Other proponents of a similar hypotheses are H. Bondi and T. Gold whose theory Prof. W. H. McCrea summarizes as follows:

> Their suggestion is that the creation of matter is a continuing process operating at the same statistical rate at all epochs, a statistically constant density being preserved by the dispersal of matter known as the expansion of the universe.
>
> It is too soon to claim that any crucial consequence of this hypothesis is definitely established by available observational data. It does, however, appear to overcome serious difficulties encountered by previous theories when confronted with these data. It promises also to afford a satisfactory account of the formation of galaxies and systems of galaxies, a type of problem about which the previous theories have little information to offer.[25]

The latter theory in addition postulates that this "creative act" is taking place in a random manner thorughout space; and that in general these new particles will tend to unite themselves to the nearest galaxy.[26]

In neither case is it specified, however, precisely what is meant by the term "creation," whether it is the production of matter from nothing *(ex nihilo)*, or merely the *transformation* of something already existing, as, for example, energy, into matter. Both agree that neutrons could be the initial particles produced, from which would be formed hydrogen atoms and subsequently the more complex atoms. The notion of an expanding universe is retained by both of the alernative hypotheses, although the phrase "expanding universe" does not carry the same meaning in each case. But neither one, it so appears, predicts whether this expansion is to have a final term; that it must have had a beginning is obvious. In any event, here and now, even though it may be continuously expanding, the universe is viewed as having a *finite* volume.

What's On the Other Side?

The foregoing pages have contained a discussion of the observational basis and the scientific reasoning which provide a fairly substantial foundation of or the temporal and spatial finitude of the universe. There are yet a great many difficulties to be solved, perhaps even more than there were a hundred years ago, for it seems to be a characteristic of human knowledge that for every one question answered there arise at least two new questions. One obvious reason for this is that the formulation of a question requires a certain minimum knowledge, and hence with an increase of knowledge a basis is provided for the posing of new questions, which when answered, start the cycle over again. In the art of asking questions it is important that the proper question be asked, that it be asked at the right time, and that it be asked of competent authority. An example of this is afforded by a question that would arise in most people's minds upon hearing that the universe has a finite volume and radius: if there is a boundary, what's on the other side?

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[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 9.

Undoubtedly this question has occured to those who have propounded the above mentioned theories; but little, if any, attempt has been made to solve it, although Eddington's statement regarding the nature of a finite but unbounded space might be considered as a suggestion. Yet if space is finite in volume, it must be limited; and to be limited means to be bounded in some way; but is there a "beyond" to such a boundary? A satisfactory answer to this question will not be given by a physicist who limits himself completely to the study of physical reality as it is measurable by his instruments, for the object under consideration seems to be out of reach for direct or indirect *observation:* the end of the universe cannot be seen. But, the physicist, or better the natural philosopher, who strives to learn of the universe in so far as it is a *natural* reality and does not restrict himself to any particular methodology, has a much better chance of discovering the true answer to the question. Hence, having gathered and considered the pertinent facts, he would proceed by applying a few general principles to the problem.

First of all, the expression "finite physical universe" is understood to include all of the physical creation, so that beyond it and outside of it, in the physical order, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, non-being. And non-being is neither sensible nor intelligible. The imagination here is not only of no help but is of positive hindrance for, since it is an organic faculty, it is limited to sensible experiences and their recombinations. The intellect cannot form a direct concept of it because non-being lacks completely any reality; all that the mind can do is to deny being and say "non-being." Further, it is certainly not a vast, empty black space, for space is constituted by bodies, as even the modern physicist implicitly holds when he considers the presence of physical bodies a requisite for the word "space" to have any meaning. Secondly, a boundary or term in the common usage of the word signifies a division of *something* from *something* else, whereas, for the matter at hand, the precise point under consideration is the separation of *something,* the physical universe, from *nothing,* i.e., from non-being. But the essential character of a term is that it terminates something, that it closes it off from further being, as, for example, a point terminates a line, a line a plane, or midnight of December 31st terminates the year. Furthermore, the term and the subject which it terminates are only modally distinct; they are not physically separable but are distinguished by the precise function each has.

Hence, a finite universe must have a term, otherwise it would not be limited in spatial extent. Any attempt to imagine such a boundary or term is fatal to the concept, and for the same reason it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assign with any degree of certainty a definite geometrical form to the universe. That it has a form is certain, but as to what it is, this is another question. Perhaps, then, the suggested construct of the relativists for the universe as interpreted by Eddington may be closer to the truth than is usually recognized by those outside of that school.

Limitation of Mathematics

In spite of the wonderful and beneficial advances made by science in the past few centuries, there is yet a very serious shortcoming in most of the cosmological research of today. Since the time of Newton and his contemporary, Leibnitz, an increasing number of scientists have restricted themselves more and more to a mathematical approach in the study of nature. This has been especially true at both ends of the cosmic scale—the atomic and the astronomical. Whereas there are undoubted advantages accruing from such a treatment of very difficult problems whose very complexity or difficulty of accessibility precludes a more natural study, yet there is the tremendous disadvantage that the solutions thus obtained do not prove the existence nor establish the essence of anything. It can merely indicate the *possibility* that there is something which in some way corresponds to the particular mathematical expressions at hand. An example of this in recent times was the discovery of the meson which, as is now known, is produced when cosmic rays of tremendously high energies make a direct hit upon the nucleus of an atom. Now these can also be produced artificially in the giant cyclotrons. "Before the discovery of the mesotron (i.e., the meson) a Japanese physicist, Yukawa, had postulated on theoretical grounds the *possible* existence of particles of a mass intermediate between a proton and an electron."[27] (Italics mine). Many of the "facts" of relativity were first postulated as a consequence of mathematical deduction. In all these and similar cases, while it is true that the possible existence and nature were predicted, their reality entered the realm of certainty only after actual observation, direct or indirect, had been made.

Science and Natural Philosophy

For this reason the question of the origin of the universe can never be settled by the most elaborate mathematical apparatus available to the cosmologist. To get beyond their self-imposed limitations, mathematical physicists must recognize that there is another way of studying nature besides the one of mathematics. Aristotle was a physicist in the original and correct sense of the word: one studying the material world and its associated phenomena. Why should this study be now limited to those aspects which lend themselves to mathematical formulations? Although the physical and cosmological theories of Aristotle were faulty in many ways because of the inadequate observations of his time, he was, nevertheless, able to reason from the fact of a dynamic universe to the *existence* of a unique, infinite, and unmoved prime mover, whom we call God. But the modern physicist cannot. Why? Because by limiting himself to the mathematical beings, whose foundations are in the *quantified*—and therefore material beings, he has necessarily excluded himself from arriving at any knowledge of spiritual beings, such as the human soul and God.

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[27] Carl D. Anderson, "The Elementary Particles of Physics," *American Scientist,* 37:198, April, 1949.

Most scientists in the highly rarified atmosphere of modern physics claim that they are not attempting to represent the *real,* the universe as it really is, but that they are "humbly" satisfied with merely providing a model, a mathematically constructed "explanation" which best unites the known facts, and provides a basis for prediction of new facts which lend themselves to experimental or observational verification. This is all well and good, but *only as an aid* to the study of nature; it must not be allowed to substitute for a more *natural* investigation of nature. Hence, the conclusion, that what is needed is a "holistic" approach, a study of physical creation *as it is,* neither disdaining the principles of Aristotle because they are principles, and "old" ones at that; nor looking with contempt upon the facts and observations of the modern scientist because they are facts and new.

Had not the 15th and 16th centuries seen a decadence of scholastic philosophy with a concomitant growth of the experimental method as something independent and exclusive of natural philosophy, the resulting split between what is now called "science" and natural philosophy might have not occured. This division is artificial and detrimental to both "science" and natural philosophy for in reality they form a unified *science.* Even western civilization itself suffered from such theory and practice. When men have lost the perspective of the whole, and have unduly exalted a part, there result monstrosities of thought which can terminate only in the deification of the universe and the abuse of knowledge as power. Had the experimental sciences not been cut off from natural philosophy (thus retaining a relationship with the remainder of the philosophical sciences), atomic energy might have developed in a civilization adequately prepared for its proper utilization. The creature would not have been mistaken for the Creator, the finite for the Infinite; but all things of nature would have been so many tongues praising, so many fingers pointing to their Maker, the beginning and end of all things, God.

Albert Moraczewski, O.P.

MISSION ZEAL

EVEN THE most elementary knowledge of Dominican history is sufficient to show that missionary activity is one of the Order's foremost contributions to Holy Mother Church. This ardent desire to give to others, especially to those of a different faith, is clearly seen through the many centuries of the Order's existence.

St. Dominic, the glorious founder of the Order of Preachers, was most completely characterized by *zeal for souls.* He became, in truth, the athlete of Christ, preaching the word of God in season and out of season, wresting souls from the slavery of Satan.

This apostolic zeal was noted even before his birth. While his mother awaited the delivery of her infant, she dreamt that she bore in her womb a dog holding a burning torch in its mouth with which the world was set aflame. His godmother had a similar dream—the child Dominic appeared with his forehead lit by a radiant star, the light from which made the world resplendent.[1]

During his whole life, in his prayer and in his preaching, Dominic remained faithful to this quest for souls. One of his foremost desires was to die a martyr's death among the barbarians of Tartary. Only in the light of this zeal for souls can we fully understand: how Dominic, as a student, sold his precious books so that he might have money to give in charity; how, as a missionary, he labored among the Albigensian heretics; and how, as a father, he founded the Order of Preachers, destined to become the "champions of the faith and true lights of the world."

His Missionary Sons

This apostolic zeal for souls, initiated by the Holy Patriarch, continued to live and flourish among his earliest sons. Master Generals like Bl. Jordan of Saxony, St. Raymond of Pennafort, John the Teuton, Humbert of the Romans, were all outstanding searchers for souls. They sent the white-robed Friars throughout the length and breadth of the then known world to preach the word of God. As early as 1252, only thirty-six years after the founding of the Order, the sons of St. Dominic were engaged in missionary work in the lands of the Saracens, Greeks, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Syrians, Goths, Jacobites, Armenians, Jews, Tartars, Hungarians, and other unbelieving people of the East. Their fields of labour were flung to the far north, where St. Hyacinth and Bl. Ceslaus converted thousands; to the deep south, to the east and to the west, where the Dominican missionaries encountered infidels and heretics.

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[1] Quoted by Bede Jarrett, *The Life of St. Dominic,* Newman Bookshop, p. 6.

Chronicles bear witness to the burning missionary zeal of these early Brethren. The following incident is typical. A General Chapter was being held at Paris presided over by Jordan of Saxony. Missionaries were badly needed in the Holy Land, and Bl. Jordan, then Master General, sought for a few volunteers among the Brethren. Hardly had he finished his appeal when nearly all present made the venia, and, with tears in their eyes, pleaded for his permission to let them become martyrs in the land consecrated by the blood of the Saviour. When the French provincial saw what was happening, he arose, made the venia with his Brethren, and addressed the Master General as follows: "Good Master, either let me keep my dear Brothers, or also send me with them, for I too am ready to go and die with them."[2]

About the Theologians

This and many other similar incidents clearly reveal an unbounded love for the missions. Yet, can we say that such missionary zeal was universal, was present in all the early Brethren? What about the great Dominican educators, the specialized theologians teaching at some center of learning? The popular mind does not usually conceive of men like St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas as "mission-minded." Since the thirteenth century, during which St. Dominic founded his Order, bore witness to the flowering of Dominican intellectualism, sanctity, and missionary zeal, it is our purpose here to discover: first, whether the great theologians of that century were in any way interested in the missions; and, secondly, if they were, how they played their rôle in this missionary drama.

History furnishes ample proof that the Order of Preachers took its rise from a missionary endeavor. After engaging with the Albigensian heretics with only slight success, St. Dominic conceived of an army of men, powerful in word and work, who would out-preach, out-fast, and out-pray the heretics. He knew that the heretics were adept in argumentation, and so, when establishing his Order, study became an essential means. St. Dominic and his first followers had to root out error and then implant the truth. Consequently, there arose a need for well-trained theologians who would be prepared to engage in the popular public disputes of the time.

Early Theologians

The learned Dominican Preachers and Doctors of the thirteenth century responded heroically to the call of their missionary Brethren. Many left the pulpit and lecturer's chair, to become devoted missionaries; others contributed much-needed ammunition in the form of treatises and textbooks to counteract heresy.

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[2] B. M. Reichert, O.P., *Vitae Fratrum Ordinis Praedictatorum*, I, Lovanii 1896, pp. 150-151.

In the land of the Albigensian heresy, where St. Dominic began his labors, missionary activity continued in full force throughout the thirteenth century. Three notable works were written by Dominican theologians against the errors of the Albigensians.[3] Moneta of Cremona, himself a converted Albigensian, is the author of two of these works. His fame as a professor has been aptly expressed in the Chronicle: *super omnes magistros mundi famosissimus.*[4]

In Poland, Rudolph of Nymegen, a chronicler of the late Middle Ages, tells of the missionary labors of St. Albert the Great. The unhappy people of this far northern country were still under barbarian laws and customs which sprang from the most brutal paganism. St. Albert was sent as papal legate to reform their morals and establish friendly relations with Rome. In his *Politicorum,* Albert refers to two of the abuses which were prevalent among them. No detailed account of the results of his labors is given, but mention is made of Albert restoring many souls to union with the Church.

St. Raymond the Missionary

The Dominican theologians of the thirteenth century also played an important role in Spain by converting many Jews and Mohammedans. St. Raymond of Pennafort, famous as a canonist and collector of the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, was the influential organizer of this missionary enterprise.[5] As early as 1229, we see him accompanying the Cardinal-Bishop of Sabina, John d'Abbeville, on a preaching crusade against the Moors. In 1240, after holding the office of Master General for two years, Raymond resigned and returned as a simple religious to assume once more his missionary work among the Jews and Moors. To further his missionary activity, he conceived a new plan of attack. With the permission of the superior who succeeded him as Master General and the assistance of James I, King of Aragon, he opened a school for the study of the Hebrew and Arabic languages. Thus the Dominican Brethren who attended these linguistic schools were enabled to preach to the Jews and Moslems in their native tongue. Results were so encouraging that soon numerous schools were opened for this very same purpose. Humbert of the Romans, with his keen vision for the future, ordered that chairs of Arabic and Hebrew be founded in the *studia* of the Order to prepare the Brethren for further missionary work.

One of the most eloquent proofs of the success of these schools is the fact that nearly all the Arabic masters, whose lectures the Brethren attended, came eventually to a knowledge of the true faith. It was necessary to employ Arabic teachers because Christians were not sufficiently qualified to assume the position. Paul Christiani[6] was a shining example of these converted Arabic teachers. Not only did he become a Christian, but later received the habit of St. Dominic, and for many years he labored fruitfully among his own people as a controversialist. His keen theological learning is best evidenced in a disputation which he had with the learned Spanish Rabbi, Moses Nachmani. After disputing for four days in the presence of James I, King of Aragon, and a vast concourse of people, he finally triumphed over his stubborn opponent.[7]

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[3] Titles of the works: *Summae contra Catharos;* and *Summa adversus Catharos et Valdenses,* by Moneta of Cremona. A small work written against the Cathari, Leonists, and the so-called Poor Men of Lyons by Ranier Sacchoni.

[4] B. M. Reichert, O.P., *Chronica Ordinis Praedicatorum,* Romae 1897, p. 19.

[5] Cf. M. Grabmann, "Die Missionsidee bei den Dominikaner-theologen des 13 Jahrhunderts," in *Zeitschrift fur Missionwissenschaft,* 1911, p. 139. T. M. Schwertner, O.P., *St. Raymond of Pennafort,* Bruce, 1935, pp. 105-122.

St. Thomas the Missionary

Not only did St. Raymond labor for many years as a true missionary and establish numerous linguistic schools (also called "Raymundian" schools) for the study of the Hebrew and Arabic languages, but he also enlisted the intellectual genius of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Missionary cause. Raymond early realized the Dominican missionary's subsequent need of a textbook in which objections would be considered and refuted by sound reasoning and philosophy. St. Thomas satisfied this need by writing, at Raymond's request, the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* the classical guide for the missionary in the Middle Ages. The work was intended to be a handbook of polemics, which would equip the missionary to refute error and instill truth.[8]

Besides the *Summa contra Gentiles,* St. Thomas wrote another work for the missionary, this time for the missionary who would labor in the Orient. It was addressed to a certain *cantor Antiochenus.*[9] Historical research has never revealed his identity, but two possibilities have been proposed by Uccelli, noted Italian research scholar: one, that he was a Dominican missionary working in the Orient; the other, that he was a noted prelate in Antioch who had heard of St. Thomas' learning.[10]

Throughout his many other works, St. Thomas frequently reveals himself as a keen observer of missionary activity. In the *Summa Theologica* (II-II, q. 10), there is a treatment on unbelief which could have been written only by a man with a profound knowledge of and ardent love for the missions. In the opusculum, *De Veritate,* we find a passage that has been so frequently verified in the life of a missionary that we quote it here in full:

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[6] Cf. M. Grabmann, *op. cit.,* p. 140. B. Altaner, *Die Dominikanermissionen des 13 Jahrhunderts,* Frankes Buchhandlung, Habelschwerdt (Schles.), 1924, pp. 96-97.

[7] For the dispute, cf. Heinrich Denifle, "Quellen sur Disputation Pablos Christiani mit Moses Nachmani zu Barcelona, 1263," in *Historisches Jahrbuch,* VIII, 1887, pp. 223-244.

[8] Cf. T. Schwertner, O.P., *op. cit.,* pp. 117-118. M. Grabmann, *op, cit.,* pp. 144-142. G. A. Getino, *La Summa contra Gentes y el Pugio fidei,* Vergera, 1905, pp. 8-15, 37.

[9] Full title of the work:*De Rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Graecos, et Armenos, ad Cantorem Antiochenum.*

[10] P. A. Ucelli, S. *Thomas Aquinatis in Isaiam prophetam, in tres psalmos David, in Boethium de hebdomadibus et de trinitate expositiones etc.,* Romae, 1880, p. 488.

> The position maintaining that one is held to believe explicitly in the truths of revelation is not inconvenient, even if he is brought up in a forest among the brute animals. It pertains to divine providence to provide the necessities for salvation, provided, however, that man does not impede the workings of providence in some way. Now if one is brought up in this manner and he follows the guidance of his natural reason in desiring good and avoiding evil, it most certainly must be held that God will either reveal the truths necessary for believing by means of a private revelation, or He will direct some preacher of the faith to him, as He sent Peter to Cornelius.[11]

Other Literary Missionaries

The energetic Raymond Martin follows after St. Raymond of Pennafort as next in importance among Spanish Dominican theologian-missionaries.[12] His profound theological knowledge is glimpsed principally in his literary works. In 1250, he was among the first group of Dominican students to attend the linguistic school founded by St. Raymond at Tunis. There he made great progress in the study of the necessary languages. For many years he labored among the Jews and Moors. Despite all his apostolic activity, he found time to pen four separate treatises, two of which are extant today.[13] All his writings show a faithful dependance upon the *Summa contra Gentiles,* thus plainly proving that St. Thomas' work was fulfilling the polemical purpose for which it was composed.

Moving from Spain across North Africa into the Orient, we find the Dominican missionary and theologian busily engaged in trying to further a difficult cause. During the thirteenth century, the fiery sword of Mohammed ruled supreme. However, the apostolic labors of the Brethren again were productive of various literary treatises. William of Tripoli, who carried on a glorious missionary career among the Mohammedans, has written a work on Mohammed and the Saracens.[14] He brings this work to a close with the following statement:

> And so by only a simple sermon about God, without philosophical arguments and military arms, they (the Saracens), as simple doves, seek the baptism of Christ, and so pass over into His fold. This I said and wrote, who, by the power of God, have already baptized more than a thousand.

Another famous theologian and scholar who worked among the Orientals was Ricoldus de Monte Crucis. In 1289, he left his native Florence for the Orient, where he acquired a knowledge of the Arabic language.

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[11] *De Veritate,* q. 14, a. 11 ad 1um.

[12] Quietif-Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum,* I, p. 397 ff.

[13] Titles of the works: *Explanatio symboli Apostolorum ad institutionem fidelium; Pugio fidi adversus Mauros et Judaeos* (both works extant); *Capistrum Judaeorum; Contra Alcoranum legem Saracenorum.* For last two works, cf. B. Altanear, *Op. cit.,* p. 95.

[14] Title of the work: *De statu Saracenorum et de Mahomete pseudo-propheta eorum et eorum lege et fide.*

His missionary labors took him through Turkey to the Caspian Sea, and even into parts of Tartary. He has recorded many of his exciting experiences in an itinerary. Besides this work, he has written two other treatises.[15]

Conclusion

What conclusion can be drawn from this historical data about the thirteenth century Dominican scholar and missionary? One thing is certain: many of the learned Dominican theologians of that century had an ardent love and intense interest in the missions of their time. When called upon, they were most willing to help in whatever way they were able. Some wrote for missionaries; others worked as missionaries; still others did both. Like their father, St. Dominic, they too can be fully characterized by *zeal for souls.*

The specialized theologian of today will find the same missionary opportunities as the theologians of the thirteenth century, a century considered as the model for things Dominican. Instead of looking upon the work of a missionary as something beneath his scientific learning and foreign to his professorial duties, the specialized theologian should think a second time and see missionary work as an essential part of his own work. Considered as such, the theologian will readily realize his obligations. He will want to help the missionary, for he wants to do his own task well. In addition to the obligation of praying for the missions which is incumbent upon all Christians, he can give special help in diverse ways: by instilling missionary zeal in his students; by being ever ready to clarify problems too intricate for the missionary; by personally encouraging the missionary in his burdensome labors; and, if God so wills, by willingly engaging in missionary work. In this way he will be repeating the work of his glorious predecessors in the thirteenth century—predecessors of whom we are all so justly proud.

Nicholas Ashenbrener, O.P.

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[15] Titles of the works: *Itinerarium; Propugnaculum fidei adversus mendacia et deliramenta Saracenorum; Libellus contra nationes orientales, de Discrimine Judaeos, gentiles, et Mahomethanos* (unedited). Cf. B. Altaner, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

INTERFAITH MEETINGS

THE HUMAN person naturally rebels against disunion and confusion. Some cannot tolerate a crooked picture on the wall; others rebel against a disarray of books on a shelf, or a pile of junk in the back yard. Even more violently do people react against confusion and disunion of thought and action. Disunion has about it an air of insanity, the confusion of a thinking creature such as man.

A crooked picture is easily straightened, books quickly rearranged, and junk is easily carted off to the city dump. Reaching union of thought and action is not so easily and quickly accomplished, especially when vast numbers of people are involved, differing almost infinitely in their views and aims. This is the picture we see as we look at varied churches and beliefs which have sprung up since the Reformation. They are so many branches cut off from the vine; sheep out of the fold of the true Shepherd.

Protestants are deeply conscious of their disunity, and often look with envy at the unity of the Catholic Church. During recent years we have seen attempts among non-Catholics to arrive at some type of unity, if not unity of belief and doctrine, at least unity of action. The movement has gained momentum over the years, but results have been meager. An essential element is lacking: the recognition of a divinely-established teaching authority. This element can be supplied only by the Catholic Church which has been entrusted with the deposit of divine faith and has been given the commission to preserve this deposit in its entirety and integrity. What has been the Church's reaction to the universal desire for unity?

Christian Cooperation

Since the social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII, an ever recurring theme can be perceived in Papal pronouncements. The extent and destructiveness of social and moral evils in the world are such that they exceed the capabilities of Catholics to correct them unaided. The popes have continually urged Catholics to seek out and cooperate with those people and groups of people outside the Church who are of good will and are earnestly seeking the improvement of society and morals along truly Christian lines. This invitation has been open to all groups regardless of race or creed. Our present Holy Father in particular has urged all the peoples of the world to cooperate in establishing a just and lasting peace.

Although the cooperation encouraged by the Popes of the past half century has been on the purely natural and social level, still even this type of cooperation between Catholics and groups of other faiths is filled with grave danger and many difficulties for Catholics. It is difficult, if not impossible, for one to distinguish clearly and distinctly between one's faith and the problems to be solved in the purely "natural" and social order. Faith colors all our thinking and directs all our action even in the "natural" and social plane. It is not to be wondered at, then, that religious and doctrinal questions arise at interdenominational meetings and conferences which were initiated to discuss solutions to problems in the natural social order. Conferences and public discussions on questions of faith between Catholics and non-Catholics have occasioned canonical legislation and pronouncements from the various Sacred Congregations. A study and review of these will help to show in what way and to what degree Catholics can participate in such discussions, what safeguards must be employed, and what permissions must be sought.

Before going into the existing legislation on this subject it will be well to examine briefly the general morality of such discussions as well as the historical background of our present legislation.

Morality of Mixed Discussions

In general, the same criteria used to determine the morality of any human act can be used to determine the morality of interdenominational discussion on matters of faith. An act is morally good if its object, the intention of the agent, and the associated circumstances are good; it is morally bad if any one of these is evil. The object of an act is that to which the act of its very nature is ordained. The object of discussing matters of faith with non-Catholics is the communication of ideas and the presentation of Catholic doctrine. As such, the act is good and perfectly licit by reason of its object. However, for a Catholic while doubting about some truth of Catholic doctrine to enter upon such a discussion with the hope of attaining certitude in his doubt, would be evil. Such an act would be gravely sinful by reason of its object. The Catholic would be guilty of the sin of infidelity and heresy, even if the discussion were with another Catholic.

The intention of the agent in this case requires little comment. Any act (even an act which is morally good from other aspects) can be totally vitiated by a bad intention. We can suppose that anyone entering on any discussions with non-Catholics is motivated by morally good aims, either the conversion of the non-Catholic or the stopping and refuting of vicious propaganda.

The circumstances surrounding public discussions with non-Catholics are the source of most of the difficulties for Catholics who attempt such discussions. It makes a great deal of difference morally who the person is who takes part in the discussions, where the discussions take place, the audience which attends the discussions, and so on through all the other circumstances. Someone who is rather weak in his faith and poorly instructed in Catholic doctrine would be rash and imprudent to take a stand against well-trained non-Catholics. He would not only be endangering his own faith, but also jeopardizing the religious loyalty of other Catholics by a poor presentation and defense of Catholic doctrine. Other circumstances will be dealt with in greater detail later on as we treat of the different pronouncements from the Holy See on this subject, since most of the existing legislation concerns the circumstances which surround interdenominational conferences.

Pre-Code Legislation

One type of discussion ruled out completely by constant tradition and even by divine law is a "joint Council" at which Catholics and known heretics are given equal rights and equal suffrage in determing questions of faith. Such a council would be a denial of the unity of faith and doctrine which Christ entrusted to Peter and the Apostles and to their successors. This was clearly recognized and acted upon from the beginning, as we can see from the very early legislation of the Church.

Apart from the foregoing exception, concerning the authoritative definition of doctrine, public discussions and disputes between Catholics and non-Catholics have their origin with Christianity itself. The gospels recount the debates between Our Lord and the Jews. *The Acts of the Apostles* records the disputes of Peter and Stephen as well as endless controversies between St. Paul and his opponents. The tradition of public discussions can be traced through the Fathers of the Church during the first six centuries. Such tireless controversialists as Rabanus Maurus, Hinsmar of Rheims, Lanfranc, St. Bernard and St. Dominic, to mention only a few, highlight the religious disputes between Catholics and heretics during the Middle Ages. Later theologians discussed the morality of such conferences and judged them to be lawful and even praiseworthy when employed to refute errors and disseminate true doctrine. They outlined the conditions for such conferences, and in general listed the precautions which must be used in dealing with such matters.

The first canonical legislation on this subject appeared during the pontificate of Pope Alexander IV (1254-1261), when a decree was issued forbidding the faithful under pain of excommunication to enter upon either public or private disputes with heretics. Although this decree has been abrogated by subsequent legislation, still the reasons which prompted it remain valid today and are worthy of further consideration. The first reason is that such conferences involve the teaching authority of the Church, which, as such, pertains only to clerics, who must have at least a canonical mission from their bishops in order to teach. The second reason is that the faithful, for the most part, are not sufficiently instructed in theology and sacred scripture, and, consequently, danger to the doctrines of the Church would result from inadequate presentation of them.

The bulk of the legislation which forms the historical background for our present canons appeared during the period following the Reformation.

After many fruitless attempts to bring back the Reformers through public debates and conferences, ecclesiastical authorities saw that such debates resulted in more harm than good. The Reformers would not listen to reason, nor would they accept arguments from tradition, the Fathers, or the Councils of the Church. Even the arguments from sacred scripture were of no avail, since the doctrine of private interpretation for all practical purposes denied any objective truth in the scriptures. Such meetings as the Colloquy of Haguenau in 1540, the Conference of Augsburg in 1530, the Colloquy of Ratisbon in 1541, and the Conference at Worms in 1557 are typical of sterile attempts to bring the Reformers back to the fold of Christ through public debate. The conferences led only to more heresy and greater separation from the Church, as well as to undue notoriety for the new heretical doctrines.

A hundred years of such experiences resulted in a series of decrees from the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda. The first one, issued on March 8, 1625, forbade all public disputations with heretics and stated the reasons for the probibition. It also directed that when such disputations could not be avoided, the Sacred Congregation should be informed and it would decide what was to be done. In 1631, a particular prohibition was contained in a rescript sent to the missionaries in Constantinople from the same Congregation. It reiterated the prohibition in even more forceful terms and again stated the necessity of seeking the permission of the Holy See before undertaking any disputations with heretics. Another decree of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, dated December 18, 1662, follows similar lines.

Although the foregoing decrees of the Propaganda were issued only for mission countries, decrees of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, March 6, 1625, and one from the Holy Office, January 17, 1644, prescribe the same procedure for Catholics in other parts of the world.

Legislation of the Code

This is the background of legislation which has led up to the brief but powerful canon in the present Code of Canon Law. Canon 1325 ¶ 3 states, "Catholics are not to hold disputes or conferences with non-Catholics, especially in public, without the permission of the Holy See, or in urgent cases, that of the local Ordinary."[1]

The canon itself is clear and requires little explanation. The word "Catholics" is meant to include *all* Catholics, both laity and clerics. This is evident from a recent reminder issued by the Holy Office, which we will take up later. The disputes and conferences referred to in the canon include formal debates as well as friendly meetings aimed at agreement and concord. Although the canon itself does not limit the object of the debates and meetings to questions of faith, still such a limitation can be gathered from the context in which the canon is found. This particular section of the Code deals exclusively with the teaching authority of the Church. The historical background of the canon also supports this interpretation, as will be more evident when we take up the later decrees of the Holy See on this subject.

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[1] CIC, 1325, ¶ 3. *"Caveant catholici ne disputationes vel collationes, publicas praesertim, cum acatholicis habeant, sine venia Sanctae Sedis aut, si casus urgeat, loci Ordinarii."*

The phrase "especially in public" seems to indicate that even private discussions are not altogether excluded from the prohibition of this canon; but canonists for the most part do exclude them from the prohibition. The law seems to insinuate that private discussions should not be undertaken without using great prudence and discretion, and then all the precautions dictated by the natural law must be observed. The full weight of the canon, then, is aimed at public debates and conferences. Meetings are usually considered to be public when they excede the limits of a small group or extend beyond the family circle. Other circumstances such as the challenge, the acceptance, organization, and especially the audience and the extent to which the meeting becomes known must be considered when determining whether any particular discussion is public or private. When any doubt arises the matter should be taken up with the local Ordinary.

Although the last section of the canon gives the local Ordinary the faculty in extraordinary circumstances to grant permission to a Catholic to hold interdenominational meetings, appeal to Rome must be considered the ordinary means of obtaining this permission. Insufficient time to communicate with Rome or the inability to reach Rome at all, as during the past war, would be examples of extraordinary circumstances under which the permission of the local Ordinary would suffice.

So much for the legislation as it appears in the Code of Canon Law. There can be no question as to whether this legislation is still in effect. The purpose for which it was enacted, the forestalling of the evils to the Church resulting from indiscriminate public discussions, has certainly not ceased throughout the world. The current practice of the Church and the decrees and decisions of various sacred congregations confirm this same conclusion.

Later Decrees and Decisions of the Holy See

The unity movement in England during the latter half of the last century occasioned a number of decrees from the Holy Office. The movement centered about the Society for the Union of Christendom, which was Anglican in its origin and leadership. The central theme of its discussions was the "Branch Theory" of the Church, which is a denial of the intrinsic unity which Christ intended to be one of the four outstanding characteristics of His Church. As Catholics began to participate in these discussions, the Holy Office issued a letter, September 16, 1864, to the Bishops of England pointing out the erroneous and heretical basis of the discussions and forbidding all Catholics to join the society or cooperate with it in any way. The same stand was taken by the Holy Office in

November, 1865, in a letter addressed "to certain English Puseyites", who were going over the same ground. Again in 1919 the Holy Office reaffirmed its former position in its answer to a question regarding the application of the prohibitions mentioned above. Also in 1919 the Holy Father stated the same position during an audience with a delegation from the Episcopal "World Conference". The "Malines Conversations" in the early twenties in which Lord Halifax and Cardinal Mercier took active part were discontinued in 1926 when Rome withdrew its tacit approval. In 1925 and again in 1927 the Holy Father courteously declined the invitation to send representatives to the conferences convoked by Protestant leaders in Stockholm and Lausanne.

If one wanted an even clearer and more definitive statement of the attitude of the Holy See regarding the particular type of conventions which we have been discussing, he would have to go no further than the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI *On the Promotion of True Christian Unity*, January 6, 1928. The intention of the following excerpt cannot be questioned.

> It is evident that the Holy See can in no way participate in their meetings, nor may Catholics either favor or cooperate in any way in such enterprises; if they should do so, they would be giving their support of a false Christian religion which is entirely foreign to the one Church of Christ. Shall We permit—a thing which would be utterly wrong—that the truth, revealed by God, should be determined by agreements?

Although the foregoing pronouncements from the Holy See deal with a particular type of discussions (those based on a false notion of the unity of the Church of Christ), still they shed some light on the more general question of public discussions with non-Catholics. Two other pronouncements bring us back to the more general question.

On September 18, 1895, Pope Leo XIII addressed a letter to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States discouraging in rather emphatic terms the participation of Catholics in the meetings conducted at the "World's Parliament of Religion", which was being held at that time in Chicago. The Holy Father suggested that Catholics hold their meetings separately, but "these meetings may be so arranged that all persons, even those who are separated from the Church, may attend them".

Another instruction issued in 1902 by the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs applied the prohibitions contained in the decrees of February 7, 1645, and March 8, 1625, of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda to the public discussions with Socialists which were then taking place in Italy. A more careful study of this instruction and a determination of the extent to which it is applicable today in our discussions with Socialists and Communists would prove a fruitful field for research, but such a study would exceed the scope and intent of this article. Suffice it to say that such an instruction was issued, and that it was an active application in our age of the earlier legislation of the Church.

Our study of the legislation of the Church regarding public discussions with non-Catholics has thus far been chiefly historical, but such an approach is necessary to set the stage upon which we must view the two latest communications issued by the Holy Office, one on June 5, 1948, and the other on December 20, 1949. Without a thorough understanding of the traditional stand of the Church on this matter one might tend to read more into these decrees than they really contain. We will treat these two decrees in greater detail than the ones we have already mentioned since these latest decrees contain the norms which are applicable here and now for those engaged in interdenominational discussions.

New Decrees of the Holy Office

The first of the two latest decrees is the *monitum* issued by the Holy Office on June 5, 1948. It really contains nothing that is strictly new, but merely repeats very emphatically the prescriptions laid down by the Code of Canon Law, already discussed. It mentions the fact that mixed gatherings of non-Catholics and Catholics were being held in various places without the previous permission of the Holy See, which the law requires; and it directs Ordinaries to insist on the fulfillment of these prescriptions. The *monitum* makes special mention of "ecumenical" gatherings, and states that under *no* circumstances may Catholics, whether lay persons or clerics, take part in these without the previous consent of the Holy See. In the document, Catholics are also reminded that all communication in sacred rites is absolutely forbidden, according to the norm of Canons 1258 and 731, ¶ 2. Although the subject of communication in sacred rites is closely allied to the subject under discussion in this article, it forms a separate field for investigation, and is treated separately in the Code. Hence, we will not go into it here, although such a study seems most timely, owing to the laxity of many Catholics in this regard.

The *monitum* of the Holy Office had various effects throughout the Church. Some interpreted it as a complete prohibition of all cooperation with non-Catholics, or they at least considered the conditions imposed by the Holy See to be so exacting as to render such cooperation impossible. Others saw the *monitum* more for what it really was, a directive aimed at correcting the abuses which had sprung up contrary to the law. The intention was not to forbid mixed gatherings outright, but only to insist that such gatherings could not be held without the previous sanction of competent ecclesiastical authority, which at the time was the Holy See, or, in more urgent cases only, the local Ordinary. Owing partly to the confusion which arose after the *monitum* was issued and chiefly to the number of petitions sent to the Holy See for permission to hold mixed discussions, the Holy Office issued a lengthy Instruction on December 20, 1949, dealing with the matter in greater detail. The Instruction contains an introduction and seven sections, each treating a special phase of the question.

The introduction is a general treatment of the Church's concern for the union of all Christendom in the one Church established by Our Lord. Aware of the growing desire for unity among people outside the Church, the Holy See is anxious to put the fullness of Catholic doctrine at the disposal of all those who are sincerely seeking the truth. The movement for unity is good, and the Church wishes to encourage and promote it. However, the movement must not only be inspired by good intentions, but must also be based on sound principles; and even then grave dangers are not altogether absent.

Ordinaries are directed to keep the movement under observation; moreover, they are further directed to "foster and guide it". They must assist all who are seeking the truth and the true Church, and at the same time shield the faithful against the dangers which follow in the wake of the movement. It is noteworthy, and perhaps indicative of the general attitude of the Holy See, that the Instruction directs that suitable priests be appointed to give special attention to the movement. Information offices are to be established so that all who are interested in learning more about the Church may have easy access to such information.

The inculcating of a spirit of indifferentism has always been one of the chief dangers associated with the unitive movement. The Church's doctrine cannot be watered down by diplomatically emphasizing points of agreement to the exclusion of points of difference. The deposit of divine faith has been given to the Church to be preserved in its purity, explained and taught to all peoples, but never to be compromised. This is the unique position of the Church. The movement for unity can be affected only in the unity of the Catholic Church. Unity, then, consists in the reconciliation of dissidents to the true Church of Christ and not in the compromise of divergent doctrines. Any other basis of unity would be dishonest, stirring up false hopes that could never be fulfilled. It is perfectly true that the necessity of insisting upon this point and of avoiding all pretense where this basic Catholic attitude is concerned makes it difficult to approach non-Catholics on the subject of Church unity. It is true, too, that the attitude of the Church is hard for those outside her fold to understand. But it is this fundamental principle which can never be compromised, never be disguised—for it is precisely on this matter that the Church differs *essentially* and in *principle* with the other Christian churches. This is the reason why there is so much insistence upon this point in the Instruction. And it has very likely been abuse in this regard which made the present Instruction and the preceeding *monitum* necessary.

Sections III and IV of the Instruction of the Holy Office deal more explicitly with our subject: public discussions with non-Catholics. Ordinaries are directed to exercise exceptional watchfulness over these ventures. In general, only priests, specially qualified in expounding and defending Catholic doctrine, may be permitted to participate in mixed conferences. The meetings should be kept small, since seldom does any good come from large common assemblies. All these mixed gatherings are subject to the *monitum,* discussed earlier. They are not forbidden outright, but they cannot be initiated without approval of ecclesiastical authority. In the case of local conferences, local Ordinaries are hereby empowered with the faculty to grant the requisite permission under the following three conditions:

> 1) that all communication in sacred rites be utterly eschewed;
>
> 2) that the discussions and proceedings be duly supervised and directed;
>
> 3) that at the end of each year a report be made to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, specifying the place where such assemblies were held and what experiences were gathered from them.

For convoking national and international conferences the previous permission of the Holy See is still necessary. It is worthy of note that the faithful at large, in accordance with point III of the Instruction, are prohibited from attendance at the conferences. The general tenor of the Instruction seems to be that such discussions are to take place among experts, with a sincere effort at reconciliation, and the general public is not to be present at the actual meetings.

It is not to be thought that the effect of this pronouncement is to discourage conferences on matters of faith with non-Catholics. The contrary would, indeed, seem to be the case. Throughout the Instruction the Sacred Congregation uses only terms of high praise for the efforts aimed at Christian unity. Ordinaries are instructed to encourage the work, to appoint special priests who will take an active interest in it. The Instruction speaks of the work as "motivated by the best of intentions" and "often sprung from sound principles". In the concluding section (VII) we find these words:

> This excellent work of "reunion" of all Christians in the one true Faith and Church should daily become more integrated as a distinguished portion in the universal pastoral charge and be made an object of concern that the whole Catholic people take to heart and recommend to God in fervent supplications.

What, then, is the effect of this Instruction? Its effect is to correct abuse, which has taken two principal forms: first, neglect in regard to seeking the required permission for inter-faith conferences; second, dissimulation of the Church's true position regarding unity in order to win the good will of those outside the Church. Finally, future efforts for unity are definitely encouraged and impetus is given to an even wider scope of activity. The faculties delegated to Ordinaries are designed to make the obtaining of the required permission easier. Throughout the entire procedure, regulations are promulgated which make the vigilance and direction of ecclesiastical authority both mandatory and facile.

Conclusions

When we view the new decrees in the light of the past ecclesiastical legislation, we are able to draw some interesting conclusions. We will mention only three general conclusions here, although others, dealing more with details, can be found by closer study.

The first and most obvious conclusion is that *the new decrees do not indicate a radical change from the traditional position of the Church.* Although the source of the previous ecclesiastical permission to hold mixed religious conferences with non-Catholics is now more easily accessible, this does not mean that the permission will be more readily granted. The same dangers are present, and the same precautions must be employed now as always. Local Ordinaries are nearer to the places where the conferences will be held. They are also more familiar with the prevailing conditions and attitudes in their dioceses. Consequently they are in a better position perhaps than the Holy See itself to determine when such conferences are needed and when they will be productive of any good. Favorable conditions will not always be present in all the dioceses at the same time, so we need not be surprised to find permission to hold mixed conferences given in one diocese while the same permission is refused in another. The annual reports to Rome, which the latest Instruction requires, will keep the Holy See informed of what is being done and the results accomplished. In this way the Holy See still retains a finger on the pulse of the unitive movement.

The second conclusion which can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the present decrees of the Holy Office and past legislation concerns the manner of approach to the problem of mixed discussions. The approach which is to be used now is not a new one. The doctrines of the Church cannot be whittled down to the size acceptable to non-Catholics. *No compromise of fundamentals can be tolerated. A clear and unequivocal statement of the doctrines and position of the Church* should not be antagonistic to anyone sincerely seeking the truth. Truth is a stumbling block only for those who want to remain in darkness. Why, then, try to shroud the doctrines of the Church in darkness and ambiguity? Those who are willing to listen to the exposition of the Church's doctrine and, under the inspiring grace of God, are willing to accept the truth of the Catholic, have a right to a clear and unbiased explanation of those doctrines. We can do nothing but pray for those who refuse the light and wish to wallow in the obscurity of confusion.

The third and last conclusion deals with the *spirit of encouragement* which characterizes the last instruction. In a world still struggling midst the havoc wrought by war, and the threats of another war, *the Holy See manifests a spirit of optimism.* Out of chaos, humbly accepted in the spirit of sacrifice to God, a new and glorious world can emerge. Fire purifies gold; the plowshare prepares the soil for an abundant harvest. Suffering humbly accepted, purifies man before God. How else can people be brought to the consciousness of their sins, of their need for God, and of their utter dependence upon Him? Today people are realizing the inadequacies of the flesh-pots of materialism and are again turning their eyes and hearts to God. The Church, the Spouse of Christ, is ready to fill with the fullness and the happiness of the life of Christ the hearts which have been emptied of worldly desires through suffering. Only in the unity with the Spouse of Christ in this life and eternal union with Our Lord in the life to come, can men find their way out of today's disunion and confusion into the unity of thought and action which all desire.

Humbert Determan, O.P.

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